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Introduction
By Nature's swift and secret-working hand,
The garden glows, and fills the liberal air
.. while the promised fruit
Lies yet a little embryo, unperceived.
-James Thomson'
Nearly three centuries ago, when the House of Commons ratified the
Statute of Anne, 2 Britain's first copyright statute,3 it drew a sharp line that
uncoupled the rights of owners of literary property4 from those of owners
of more traditional possessions, such as land. Specifically, the drafters of
the Statute of Anne sought to displace traditional copyright principles,
based on common law, with legislative enactments that alone would define
the scope of literary property rights.5 The Statute vested copyright holders
with a maximum twenty-eight year monopoly, during which time they
could defend their copyrights in court against infringers and pirate pub-
lishers. 6 But there was a catch: When the monopoly expired, with it van-
ished any potential claims against infringers. 7 The formerly copyrighted
work passed into the public domain, where it would forever remain freely
available for public use, a development designed to further "the Encourage-
ment of Learning," which not coincidentally was the Statute's title.8 As
interpreted in the seminal case of Donaldson v. Becket,9 the Statute of Anne
placed a higher value in the public's interest in unfettered access to pub-
lished works than in authors' and publishers' economic interest in perpet-
ual, exclusive copyright privileges. 10
1. JAMES THOMSON, Spring, in 1 THE POETICAL WORKS OF JAMES THOMSON 3, 6
(London, Bell and Daldy Fleet Street 1866).
2. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.) [hereinaf-
ter Statute of Anne], reprinted in HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE: AN ESSAY
ON AN ACT FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING, 1710, 109-17 (1956).
3. Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the
Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 365, 402 (2004).
4. This Note focuses on authors and the rights they have in relation to their literary
creations because the law of copyright historically has been linked to the written word.
However, moral rights cut across a number of creative disciplines. See Dan Rosen, Art-
ists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, an American Revolution, 2 CARDozo ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 155, 170-75 (1983). In fact, Michelangelo is popularly believed to be among the
first to have invoked the full range of moral rights. Id. When necessary, examples
drawn from the experiences of other artists, such as painting and sculpting, will be used
to illustrate a particular point.
5. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits
and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 336-37 (2000).
6. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, paras. 3 & 14 (1710) (Eng.), reprinted in RANSOM,
supra note 2, at 110 & 117.
7. See id.
8. Dallon, supra note 3, at 367-68, 403.
9. Donaldson v. Becket, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774).
10. Id. at 845 (stating that the "notion of a perpetual privilege and monop-
oly ... would be fatal to the interest of letters"), quoted in Note, Exploitative Publishers,
Untrustworthy Systems, and the Dream of a Digital Revolution for Artists, 114 HARv. L.
REv. 2438, 2442-43 n.36.
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The Framers of the U.S. Constitution retained this value judgment,
weaving into Article I their conviction that "The Congress shall have
power... To promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited
Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to... Writings" (the "Copyright
Clause").1 1 Following its constitutional mandate, Congress passed the
Copyright Act of 1790, which paralleled the Statute of Anne in granting
authors of maps, books and charts up to a twenty-eight year monopoly.
1 2
The Act fulfilled the Constitution's directive to promote learning by
empowering the public domain 1 3 to exploit noncopyrighted works for its
own ends.
Meanwhile, American courts and legislators continued to deny
authors' claims that they possessed unalienable natural rights to their
works that reached beyond the scope of the Copyright Act In Wheaton v.
Peters,14 the Supreme Court definitively repudiated the existence of an
independent strain of natural-law based copyright, and instead asserted
that copyright claims "must be examined [only] in reference to... stat-
utes."'15 Several decades later, a report appended to the Copyright Act of
1909 explicitly stated that the "enactment of copyright legislation... is not
based upon any natural right that the author has in his writing."'16 Even
during the past century, which has seen creators benefit from dramatic
extensions in the term of statutory monopolies, 17 neither Congress nor the
courts have attempted to reward creators through the establishment of a
natural law copyright regime.
By contrast, French authors have long been accustomed to defending
not only their positive law economic rights, but an entirely separate cate-
gory of "moral rights" (or droit moral) as well. Also referred to as "author's
rights" (or droit d'auteur), moral rights are grounded in the author's per-
sonhood, as though copyright were a fundamental human right i8 or a "per-
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8. (emphasis added).
12. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1834), reprinted in COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1783-1906, at 32 (Thorvald Solberg ed. 1906).
13. Professor Gordon defines the public domain in the following way:
In American law, the public domain is largely filled with creations whose period
of protection has expired, works which have been abandoned, or works for
which no protection existed ab initio. Similarly, if there are works which, under
Lockean principles, would have only limited duration or would not be capable
of being owned, they would be part of the common.
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1559 (1993).
14. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
15. Id. at 662.
16. 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976); see also Alain Strowel, Droit d'auteur and
Copyright: Between History and Nature, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT
LAw 245 (1994) (quoting the Copyright Act of 1909).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000) (extending the statutory copyright term in cases
where the author is undetermined to life of the author plus seventy years after publica-
tion, or, if the life of the author is undetermined, ninety-five years from publication or
120 years from creation, whichever is shorter).
18. DanielJ. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges
from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929,
934 (2002).
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sonal civil right[ .,"19 In France, statutes protecting authors' monopolies
exist alongside-and do not preempt-a discrete system of laws that pro-
tects their reputation. 20 Although moral rights were not codified into
French civil law until the twentieth century, they gained acceptance long
before being memorialized in statutory form. From at least the French
Revolution, and arguably dating back to the sixteenth century, the French
state has consistently protected authors' reputations, even to the detriment
of the public interest. 2 '
French law now recognizes four major categories of moral rights.
Authors have the right to "divulge," meaning they can control how their
works are communicated to the public; 2 2 the right to "retract," such that
they can recall all copies of a work that "no longer reflects its creator's
beliefs and personality";23 the right of "attribution," which prohibits others
from claiming the author's work as their own; 24 and the right of "integrity,"
which bars subsequent owners from changing the content or appearance of
an author's work.25 These rights, considered natural rights under French
law, are theoretically permanent 26 -the author or her heirs can invoke
them whether or not they retain actual ownership of the work. Thus, while
France recognizes that creators lose possession of writings that enters the
public domain, "the Moral Rights doctrine provides the author with a bun-
dle of vested rights that nonetheless remain. 2 7
The United States' opposition to moral rights legislation was a major
reason that for over a century it refused to sign on to the 1886 Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 28 ("Berne Conven-
19. Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists' Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 41, 42 (1998).
20. See Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the
Berne Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 1203,
1209-10 (2002) (explaining the philosophical underpinnings of the "dualist" approach
that recognizes both economic and moral rights). The words "prejudicial to the author's
honor or reputation" are also found in the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42
(1985) (Can.), and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised July 24, 1971)
[hereinafter Berne Convention], reprinted in SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 929-55 (1987).
21. See generally CYNTHIAJ. BROWN, POETS, PATRONS, AND PRINTERS: CRISIS OF AUTHOR-
ITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL FRANCE 2-59 (1995) (surveying the legal and extra-legal actions of
several sixteenth-century French authors to protect their reputations); Calvin D. Peeler,
From the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and French Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 423, 437-53 (1999) (discussing the history of copyright laws in France
and the development of authors' moral rights).
22. Thierry Joffrain, Comment, Deriving a (Moral) Right for Creators, 36 TEx. INT'L
LJ. 735, 762-67 (2001).
23. Id. at 767-68.
24. Id. at 768-70.
25. Id. at 771-76.
26. While moral rights advocates believe that in theory moral rights should exist in
perpetuity, as a practical matter they are subject to the same statutory limits as their
economic counterparts. See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Frame-
work for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1300 (2003).
27. Suhl, supra note 20, at 1205.
28. Berne Convention, supra note 20.
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tion" or "Berne"), considered "the premier multilateral copyright
agreement."'29 Initially the United States did not ratify the Berne Conven-
tion because it feared liability for its nonenforcement of widespread
infringement of European copyrights; 30 but its stance hardened ideologi-
cally when the Rome Convention of 1928 passed article 6bis, which incor-
porated the moral rights of attribution and integrity into the Berne
Convention.3 1 In 1988 however, the United States finally acceded to
Berne 3 2 when it recognized that the piecemeal bilateral agreements it had
established to that point were grossly insufficient to protect the piracy of
its own cultural exports. 33 Nevertheless, despite the United States' status
as a signatory nation, it has balked at implementing a moral rights regime
in accordance with article 6bis, and in fact argued that current laws pro-
vided sufficient protection of personality interests.
34
Long before the Berne treaty, and especially in light of its passage,
many commentators have clamored for the wholesale incorporation of
moral rights laws to enable the United States to "catch up" to its European
brethren.35 This implies that not only would such a transplant be substan-
tively beneficial, but also that it would be feasible, in that moral rights
legislation would not unravel two centuries of congressional copyright stat-
utes and common law precedent. To defuse this concern, some contend
that the economic rights/moral rights divide is overblown, noting that "the
long experience of many nations indicates that recognizing moral rights
and restricting their alienability is not obviously lethal to such goals as
29. Dallon, supra note 3, at 440 n.471 (quoting ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R.
THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS
§ 12.1, at 273 (2003)).
30. Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term
Extension: How Long Is Too Long, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 651, 696 (2000) ("One
reason that we did not have particularly strong copyright laws until relatively late in the
game was that we thought the balance of economics favored piracy over protection.");
Monica E. Antezana, Note, The European Union Internet Copyright Directive as Even More
Than It Envisions: Toward a Supra-EU Harmonization of Copyright Policy and Theory, 26
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 415, 423-24 (2003) (noting that in fact "during much of the
nineteenth century, the United States was infamous as a 'pirate' nation-the best-selling
literary works in America were unapproved, 'piratical' copies of British works," quoting
CRAIG JOYCE ET AL.,, COPYRIGHT LAW 35 (5th ed. 2001).
31. Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 6bis
32. Antezana, supra note 30, at 424.
33. Id. at 423, 426.
34. Id. at 426-27.
35. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 4, at 181, 188 (noting that while American expansion
westward "allowed little opportunity for artistic development and appreciation,"
America today "is attuned to the artists' ethic and emphasis on individuality ... [so that
tihe social climate .. .is ripe for the moral rights doctrine to arise"); Jimmy A. Frazier,
Comment, On Moral Rights, Artist-Centered Legislation, and the Role of the State in Art
Worlds: Notes on Building a Sociology of Copyright Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 313, 343-46
(1995) (stating that the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5130 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. at 106A) [hereinafter VARA], which grants limited
moral rights to artists, "marks a significant turning point in American copyright law"
even though it does not extend to authors); William Patry, Choice of Law and Interna-
tional Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 404 (2000) (arguing that American "laws are
substantially below world norms," in spite of the U.S.'s signing of the Berne Treaty).
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equitable remuneration or public dissemination."36 Others are cautiously
optimistic that the 1990 passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA")
will eventually erode Americans' misplaced distrust of moral rights, 37 and
argue that more mainstream causes of action, such as misappropriation
and unfair competition, have long protected authors' interests and therefore
demonstrate that moral rights are entirely "compatible with American
[copyright] law."'3 8 Finally, there are those contending that, regardless of
any threshold difficulties in implementation, moral rights expansion is
critical because the United States cannot preserve its "vast cultural legacy"
unless it "provide[s] more full moral rights protection to meet society's
changing needs." 39
However, the cool reception with which courts have greeted litigants
seeking relief under VARA and its state law analogues, coupled with the
Supreme Court's unanimous rebuff in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp.40 of what it considered a quasi-moral rights claim, demon-
strate that these hypotheses are untenable. It is true that the assimilation
of moral rights has lagged in part simply because they are unpopular, 41
and that legislative efforts to give effect to the Berne Convention have been
halfhearted at best.4 2 Nevertheless, this Note argues that the failure of
authors' rights to gain a foothold in the United States is largely a conse-
quence of their inherent nature as codifications of idiosyncratic French
conceptions of natural rights, which are at loggerheads with the Anglo-
American missive to displace natural law copyright in favor of an artificially
calibrated copyright regime that favors a free public domain over creators'
latent reputation interests.
Part I examines the foundations of British copyright law, with special
emphasis on key developments and cases from the introduction of the
printing press to the eighteenth century. Part II traces the evolution of
French copyright, focusing on early sixteenth-century court decisions and
developments in the century following the French Revolution. Part III
surveys the elimination of natural law in American copyright from the
colonial years to the present day. Part IV discusses the implications of the
Berne Convention and chronicles the failure of moral rights to penetrate
U.S. copyright jurisprudence, as exemplified by the Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.4 3 .
36. Joffrain, supra note 22, at 777.
37. VARA, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (granting creators of certain visual artworks the rights
of attribution and integrity); Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordance
of Copyright Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 601, 605-06, 643 (2001).
38. See Gunlicks, supra note 37, at 605.
39. Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Compar-
ison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
361, 364 (1998).
40. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
41. Gunlicks, supra note 37, at 643.
42. Antezana, supra note 30, at 428.
43. Dastar, 539 U.S. 23.
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I. "Confounded in the Dust, Adore That Power";4 4 Or, the
Foundations of British Copyright Law
A. The Stationers' Copyright and a Property Right in Copies.
The age of printing began in Great Britain in 1476, the year William
Caxton introduced the printing press to England.4 5 As early as the four-
teenth century, however, several guilds of tradesmen, specially trained in
book production, had organized in medieval London.4 6 Over the span of
eighty years following the printing press's introduction, the guilds and
their printing-age equivalents united to form the Stationers' Company,
which, in 1557, was granted quasi-legislative and judicial powers to regu-
late the printing industry.4 7 The Company's status as a royally sanctioned
monopoly, allowed it to control which authors and what content was
printed, and because it abided by the social order, that so preoccupied the
monarchs, the Stationers' Company played a critical role in the develop-
ment of Anglo-American copyright law, ensuring that the interests of copy-
right holders would be forever subordinated to the public interest.48 Also,
while the Company respected authors' interests in the integrity of their
texts, it did so more out of courtesy than obligation.4 9 Only the interven-
tion of a monarch on a creator's behalf could truly prevent a publisher
from altering the original work.50
The link between the public interest and copyright first manifested
itself in the guise of censorship.5 1 Just a decade after the printing press's
introduction, the royal family began to recognize that an unfettered press
could become an effective means for proliferating controversial religious
and political doctrines. 52 More to the point, the monarchs understood that
printers of seditious or heretical materials-capable of producing
thousands of volumes in a relatively short span of time-possessed a far
greater capacity to undermine the throne than the authors of those very
same works, for it was the printers who had access to the means of repro-
duction. 5 3 Thus, rather than proscribing the creation of inflammatory
writings, censorship decrees largely targeted those with access to the print-
ing presses.54
44. JAMES THOMSON, Winter, in 1 THE POETICAL WORKS OF JAMES THOMSON, supra note
1, at 183.
45. RANSOM, supra note 2, at 6.
46. CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS' COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403-1959, at 22
(1960).
47. Id. at 23-33. The four pre-printing press trades involved in the production of
books were the parchminer, the scrivener, the lymner, and the bookbinder. Id. at 22.
48. See generally id. at 23-33.
49. SeeJOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF COP-
YRIGHT IN BRITAIN 28-33 (1994).
50. Id.
51. RANSOM, supra note 2, at 24-25.
52. See id. at 29-31.
53. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 23 (1968).
54. The U.S. Supreme Court has regarded laws restricting the freedom of printers as
archetypal censorship statutes. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750
(1988).
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As early as 1486 to 1487, Henry VII banned the printing of "forged
tydings and tales and seditious Rumors. ' ' 5" After sedition, heretical materi-
als were next on the list: the budding Protestant Reformation, fueled by the
proliferation of Martin Luther's Reformation literature, 56 caused Henry
VIII to follow in his father's footsteps and institute the first censorship
decree regarding religious texts in 1529, "for resysting and withstandyng of
most dampnable Heresyes / sowen within this realme / by the disciples of
Luther and other Heretykes / perverters of Christes Relygion. ' ' 57 In 1538,
recognizing that his royal decree did nothing to stop the flow of subversive
texts, Henry VIII instituted a licensing system, requiring printers to submit
works that they intended to publish for examination by the royal
licensors. 58
Between 1538 and 1557, a succession of monarchs concocted numer-
ous licensing schemes to smother dissent-with varying degrees of fail-
ure. 59 Finally, Queen Mary, recognizing that her own licensers lacked the
skill and resourcefulness to flush out illicit publishers, yielded to the Sta-
tioners' Company's lobbying efforts and chartered it as the only body in
England whose members could be licensed to print literary works.60 The
Stationers' Company, which clearly had a financial motive to see compet-
ing publishers throughout the country go out of business, benefited the
monarchy by providing "a convenient bottleneck where the content of the
books and other printed articles could be examined." 6 1 Though not explic-
itly within its purview, the Company also claimed the Crown's licensing
authority, so that Stationers' Company wardens reviewed and licensed
manuscripts according to the monarch's standards. 6 2
Copyright, literally meaning the right to make copies, was born of this
symbiotic arrangement between printers and monarchs. At the time, the
monarchs were motivated far more by their desire to control the ability of
printers to publish unauthorized works than by a noble wish to vest
55. PATTERSON, supra note 53, at 23 (quoting Proclamation Number 7, reprinted in 1
STEELE, TUDOR AND STUART PROCLAMATIONS, 1485-1714, no. 7 (1910)).
56. Roger Syn, Copyright God: Enforcement of Copyright in the Bible and Religious
Works, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 31 n.187 (2001/2002) (quoting 7 PHILIP SCHAFF, HISTORY
OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 156 (1890)).
57. PATTERSON, supra note 53, at 23 (quoting Proclamation Number 114, reprinted in
1 STEELE, TUDOR AND STUART PROCLAMATIONS, 1485-1710, no. 114 (1910)).
58. BLAGDEN, supra note 46, at 30-31 (1960); RANSOM, supra note 2, at 25; Michael
D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. LJ. 3, 23
(2001).
59. See BLAGDEN, supra note 46, at 29 (noting that the monarchs during that period-
Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Mary-were widely disliked and needed censorship for polit-
ical survival).
60. See PATTERSON, supra note 53, at 29; Birnhack, supra note 58, at 23.
61. Birnhack, supra note 58, at 23. Over a century later, Judge Aston likely mirrored
the prevailing British sentiment on these two monarchs when, in the midst of his opin-
ion in Millar he refuted plaintiff's arguments that these rulers' decrees were indicative of
the preexisting common law by referring to Henry VIII as "as despotic a prince as ever
sat upon the throne" and to Queen Mary as "his bigotted [sic] daughter." Millar v.
Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 239 (1769).
62. PATTERSON, supra note 53, at 40. However, ministers were the chief licensers of
important religious tomes. Id. at 41.
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authors with great power to control the publication of their own works. 63
Nonetheless, even at its formative state, the Crown had linked the copy-
right monopoly to its enduring legacy-that printed literature could be reg-
ulated to promote the public good.64 Because prospective publishers had
to formally license a work to register it and get the benefit of a valid copy-
right, which guaranteed the copyright owner perpetual protection against
infringers, 65 prospective publishers had an incentive to conform to the
monarch's conception of what types of work were most conducive to a har-
monious society.
Although booksellers would later argue that a separate common law
system flourished alongside the statutory scheme,6 6 England's history of
copyright dating to the introduction of the printing press does little to bol-
ster that claim. To the contrary, the historical record establishes that prior
to the Stationers' Company charter, "there was no copyright as such and
no protection against piracy."'67 It was only after the charter and the Star
Chamber decrees that the Company was empowered to prosecute and shut
down illegal print shops, and transformed its Court of Assistants into a
widely used arbitral body for grievances concerning literary property. 68
From its birth, then, copyright in Great Britain was largely a product of
regulatory devices.
B. The Development of the Author's Property Right
From 1557 to 1649, the Stationers' Company was the only body that
could grant a copyright backed by decrees promulgated by the Star Cham-
ber.6 9 While publishers often asserted their rights in front of the Court of
Assistants, authors did not:70 In fact, during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, when booksellers, printers, monarchs, and Parliament were all
vying for control of the burgeoning book trade, no authors asserted any
rights in British courts. 7 1 It may be assumed, then, that they thought they
had no rights that were justiciable, save the ownership right in their manu-
script prior to its sale.
63. See Joffrain, supra note 22, at 748 (commenting that "copyright law is tradition-
ally traced back to . . . a 1556 English royal decree, and the desire for censorship").
64. RANSOM, supra note 2, at 24.
65. FEATHER, supra note 49, at 17-18, 25-26. Mark Rose considers the Stationers'
Company to have presided over "a regime of regulation, rather than a regime of prop-
erty." MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 15 (Harvard
Univ. Press, 1994).
66. Dallon, supra note 3, at 413.
67. Id. at 372.
68. FEATHER, supra note 49, at 24-28. Feather does note that "the idea of rights in
copies.., was well-established before the end of the 1580's," and the Court of Assistants
was a preexisting institution, but it was only through the decrees that such practices
received royal sanction as opposed to simply constituting local custom. See id. at 25.
69. RANSOM, supra note 2, at 29, 36.
70. Id. at 12. The Court of Assistants, which decided issues of literary property, was
comprised of magistrates were required to be either a printer or a bookseller. Id.;
BLAGDEN, supra note 46, at 158.
71. ROSE, supra note 65, at 21.
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Authors' social status had always come from the patronage system, by
which a monarch or nobleman commissioned an author to pen works on
his behalf, and bestowed on him "material and immaterial rewards. '72 In
essence, the author's role as a servant of the nobility translated into an
understanding that the author had no rights independent from those of his
patron.73 Although the advent of the printing press infused authors with
more freedom to act independently, they continued to work according to
the patronage mentality.7 4 An author generally would cede all his owner-
ship interests to the bookseller purchasing his work, and the bookseller
would then petition the monarch for exclusive publishing privileges and
submit the work for review by government censors. 75 Thus, when a Sta-
tioners' Company bookseller bought an author's manuscript, the book-
seller automatically assumed all rights associated with that work.
76
Consequently, authors ceded the ability to control the "form and content of
[their] writings."77
72. Id. at 16.
73. Note, supra note 10, at 2440 ("Much as feudal lords owned title to the products
that vassals extracted from their lands, patrons enjoyed the attribution of authorship to
creative works. Writers served patrons as craftsmen, and the patron 'symbolically took
title' to a work he endorsed.").
74. See RoSE, supra note 65, at 17.
75. Dallon, supra note 3, at 381; David E. Miller, Finding a Conflicts Issue in Interna-
tional Copyright Litigation: Did the Second Circuit Misinterpret the Berne Convention in
Itar-Tass?, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 239, 248 (2000). Miller succinctly explains
the origin and functioning of the privilege system as follows:
While the printing press enabled printers and publishers to quickly reproduce
authors' books, it also enabled "pirates" to reproduce and profit from the sale of
unauthorized copies of such works. Printers and publishers, whose very exis-
tence was challenged by these "pirates," petitioned their kings for protection in
the form of an exclusive right, or "privilege." This "privilege" gave a printer or
publisher the exclusive right to reproduce and sell an author's work; in essence,
the sovereign gave the printer or publisher a limited monopoly over a specific
book. In return, this monopoly effectively enabled the sovereign to review all
books prior to publication for politically or socially subversive content, with the
purpose and result that such materials should not reach a sizeable audience.
Miller, supra.
76. RosE, supra note 65, at 18. Rose notes the following:
A playscript after it left the playwright's hands was no more the author's prop-
erty "than the cloak that he might have sold to the actors at the same time"...
Once purchased, a script, like a cloak, might be shortened or lengthened or
refurbished entirely according to the needs of the company and without consult-
ing the author.
Id. As an example of authors' marginal roles, Rose points to Ponder v. Braddill, 4 Burr
2303, 2317, 98 ER 201, 209 (1679):
Nathaniel Ponder, the publisher of [author] John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress,
took legal action . . . against Thomas Bradill [sic], who had brought out a com-
peting edition of the book .... What is significant ... is how little the issue had
to do with Bunyan as author; indeed Ponder does not appear even to have called
on Bunyan to give evidence in court .... Evidently, so far as Ponder was con-
cerned . . . the "book" belonged to the printer.
Id. at 22-23.
77. See RosE, supra note 65, at 32 (stating that dissenters in the House of Lords to
the 1693 renewal of the Licensing Act was precipitated by their awareness that the
licensing system deprived authors of their voice).
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Inspired by the Renaissance, the conception of authorship changed
incrementally from that of the Middle Ages, when authors were consigned
to the periphery of the publishing business, to a modern one where
authors were autonomous individuals whose work flowed from an
intensely personal process. 7 8 John Milton contributed greatly to the emer-
gence of the individualistic author when, in 1644, he delivered his prose
masterpiece Areopagitica.7 9 Published the year after the passage of the
Order of the Lords of Commons of 1643, a new set of orders barring unli-
censed (i.e. uncensored) printing,80 and, having himself been put on the
licensors' blacklist due to his publication of a controversial work on
divorce,8 1 Milton delivered an anti-licensing oratory, which to contempo-
rary ears still resembles a free speech anthem.82
In his speech, Milton disputed that any mere mortal could be
entrusted with the momentous task of deciding what books the public
should be allowed to read. 83 He emphasized that judges of books must be
of uncommon education and judiciousness.8 4 Comparing the current
licensing system to the late Spanish Inquisition, Milton drew a sharp dis-
tinction between the progressive, democratic England of his aspirations
and her less civilized neighbor on the mainland.8 5 It is telling, however,
that in Aeropagatica, one of the first pieces by an author in support of
authors, Milton championed authors' individuality, but not authors'
rights. 86 In contrast to early French authors,8 7 Milton's main objection to
the licensing act was unrelated to "moral" concepts such as the right to
integrity, but was rather an objection to government-imposed restraints on
trade and to monopoly.8 8 Thus, for Milton, the development of the author
as an individual with a unique personality meriting great deference did not
coincide with a belief that this personality warranted special legal
protection.
Eventually, however, authors did succeed in gaining stature as the
proper owners of their literary works. The Star Chamber, hated as it may
78. Id. at 18, 28-30.
79. Id. at 28.
80. RANSOM, supra note 2, at 71, 130-31.
81. Id. at 71. The work in question was John Milton's The Doctrine & Discipline of
Divorce.
82. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (J.C. Suffolk ed., Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd. 1968)
(1644). Aeropagitica was styled after the "classical Greek oration," in particular the
Greek Isocrates, who in the fourth or fifth century B.C. delivered a speech on democracy
to the rulers of Athens. Id. at 16. Like Isocrates, Milton delivered Aeropagitica in the
form of a speech to Parliament before publishing it in complete disregard of the entire
licensing system. Id. at 1, 15. Ironically, Milton accepted an appointment as a cen-
sor-licensor in 1651 and, himself a Protestant, was notably intolerant of aspiring Catho-
lic authors. Id. at 15; Birnhack, supra note 58, at 24.
83. MILTON, supra note 78.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 136 (referring pointedly to "this authentic Spanish policy of licensing
books").
86. See RosE, supra note 65, at 29.
87. See discussion infra Part III.A.
88. Id.
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have been, passed decrees in 1586 and 1637 establishing that literary prop-
erty could be owned.8 9 Booksellers began to form contracts with authors
in which, for consideration, the authors would grant the booksellers exclu-
sive publishing rights to their works.90 Stationers' Company printers
would not publish an author's manuscript without first receiving express
permission from the author. 9 1
Most importantly, the emergence of John Locke's theory of property
"furnished copyright doctrine with a ground in natural right that could
justify admitting the author. . . as the legal owner of a property in the
work."'9 2 Locke's central argument, that whatever a person "removes out of
the State that Nature hath provided" and "mixe[s] his Labour with" auto-
matically becomes his property,93 became a powerful message for authors.
Though initially it was booksellers who championed Locke's reasoning, a
strategy employed to justify perpetual monopolies in their copyrighted
property, they nonetheless stayed true to Locke's vision by arguing that
their property rights to a literary work only existed because an author-the
original owner-transferred it to them.9 4 Furthermore, when authors
finally began to assert their own property rights, Locke's theory of prop-
erty was their starting point.95
C. Millar and Donaldson Interpret the Statute of Anne
1. The Statute of Anne
In 1694, due in part to intense lobbying by the ubiquitous John
Locke,9 6 the House of Commons finally allowed the Licensing Act to lapse,
suddenly divesting the Stationers' Company of its monopoly after nearly
89. RANSOM, supra note 2, at 8.
90. ROSE, supra note 65, at 27 (noting that John Milton's contract for the first publi-
cation of Paradise Lost "granted to [Samuel] Symons and his executors and assigns 'All
that Booke Copy or Manuscript of a Poem entitled Paradise lost, or by whatsoever other
title or name the same is or shalbe called or distinguished"'). Milton's flexibility regard-
ing the final name of his work further demonstrates that authors of his age were not
concerned with issues of integrity, at least with regard to the title of their work, which in
modern times could be considered part of the personal expression of authorship. Id.
91. PATTERSON, supra note 53, at 69-70; ROSE, supra note 65, at 17-18.
92. DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 30 (1992).
93. Id.
94. See id. Ironically, in real life Locke was bitterly opposed to the idea of literary
monopoly, given that the Stationers' Company had refused to grant him a license to
publish an edition of Aesop's Fables. RosE, supra note 65, at 33. He voiced his objection
in a letter, arguing:
That any person or company should have patents for the sole printing of ancient
authors is very unreasonable and injurious to learning; and for those who
purchase copies from authors that now live and write, it may be reasonable to
limit their property to a certain number of years after the death of the author, or
the first printing of the book, as, suppose, fifty or seventy years.
Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE MEMORANDUM OF JOHN LOCKE. KING 202-09).
95. See RosE, supra note 65, at 72.
96. See FEATHER, supra note 49, at 50. Locke had argued to Parliament that "the
Stationers' monopoly made books too expensive, and that they merely made profits
from the fruits of other people's work." Id. Then, when the bill came up for renewal,
Locke and a number of his supporters once again lobbied the House of Commons; this
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150 years as sole guardian of the royal copyright interest. 97 The lapse
meant that printers who were not members of the Stationers' Company
could finally compete legally for authors' manuscripts. 98 It also meant
that, without the requirement of entry in the Stationers' Register, the Com-
pany was vulnerable to piracy by rival publishers, who they no longer had
the power to shut down.99 The Company then had no choice but to stoop
to petitioning Parliament to pass an act that would statutorily enforce
printers' property rights. 100
In 1709 Parliament responded with the Act for the Encouragement of
Learning, better known as the Statute of Anne. 10 1 The first copyright stat-
ute in history, the Statute granted authors a fourteen-year monopoly follow-
ing the initial publication of a work, with the possibility of renewal for an
additional fourteen-year term. 10 2 Unlike previous royal decrees, which
above all were censorship ordinances, the Statute's major purpose was to
regulate trade, and thus it contained no censorship provisions. .103 The
Statute could be, and often was, used as a sword against unlicensed print-
ers, who faced civil liability for the illicit reproduction of works "without
the Consent of the Authors or Proprietors of such Books and Writing.' 10 4
may have ultimately been a factor in the government's divesting the Stationers' Company
of its previously held power. See id.
97. Birnhack, supra note 58, at 23-24. Parliament's decision not to renew the Act
was the coup de grace of a series of setbacks for the once-mighty Stationers. The 1653
Act for the Regulation of Printing vested the Council of State, rather than the Stationers'
Company, with the responsibility of judging exclusive printing rights. RANSOM, supra
note 2, at 73. In 1680, the Stationers failed in their attempt to have the precedents and
powers of the Star Chamber transferred to King's Bench. Had their attempts succeeded,
this may have paved the way for common law perpetual copyright. Id. at 81-82.
98. FEATHER, supra note 49, at 65; see Dallon, supra note 3, at 400 (asserting that the
refusal of Parliament to renew the Licensing Act "was based in part on resentment of the
bookselling monopoly that a few publishers had effectively obtained through control of
the Company and purchase of major copyrights").
99. FEATHER, supra note 49, at 55.
100. Ransom notes that the once-mighty Stationers' Company would never have peti-
tioned Parliament for statutory protection because they would have considered that self-
degrading. Id. FEATHER, supra note 49, at 89.
101. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.). The full title was "[a]n act for the
encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or
purchasers of such copies." Id. (spelling standardized), quoted in Dalion, supra note 3,
at 402.
102. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, at 109-117; Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectiv-
ity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. LJ. 175, 181 (2000) (noting that the Statute of Anne "mark[ed] the appearance of
the terminology of 'authorship' in Western law").
103. Dallon, supra note 3, at 402.
104. RANSOM, supra note 2, at 109 (quoting the Statute of Anne). While printers and
booksellers stood to profit the most from the statutory monopoly, authors of the time
also considered this a victory. Daniel Defoe, who had lobbied for the bill's passage,
likened literary theft to child-stealing:
A Book is the Author's Property, 'tis the Child of his Inventions, the Brat of his
Brain; if he sells his Property, it then becomes the Right of the Purchaser; if not,
'tis as much his own, as his Wife and Children are his own-But behold in this
Christian Nation, these Children of our Heads are seiz'd, captivated, spirited
away, and carry'd into Captivity, and there is none to redeem them.
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As straightforward as the Statute of Anne may seem to modern sensi-
bilities, its passage ushered in an era of uncertainty, during which book-
sellers who had paid valuable considerations for what they had assumed
would be a perpetual and exclusive right to publish books, continued to
insist that the expiration of the statutory term did not abolish their prop-
erty right.10 5 Conversely, printers with no valid title to the works in ques-
tion argued that after twenty-eight years, the statute divested the prior
owner of any judiciable property rights, allowing anyone to publish the
work.10 6 According to Professor Feather:
On the one hand, there was the prevalent view that property was a natural
right, partially ceded to the state, which could be created and, having been
created, existed in perpetuity. On the other (hand?), there was the view that
all property derived from the Crown, and was therefore subject to the author-
ity of the Crown and its agents, including laws made by the Crown-in-
Parliament. 107
By the 1760's, it was generally acknowledged that authors had a natu-
ral property right to their original manuscripts, at least until they sold it
and that a bookseller.' 0 8 At stake then was, first, whether booksellers also
possessed a natural property right to those copies that constituted a per-
petual guarantee against infringement, and, second, whether those rights
could coexist alongside the statutory monopoly rights.10 9
2. Millar v. Taylor
The two cases deciding the issue both involved the works of the Scot-
tish poet James Thomson. Thomson was the author of a number of widely
popular poems, including a compilation entitled The Seasons, which con-
tained the previously published works Winter, Summer, Spring, and
Autumn. 110 In 1729, Thomson sold all rights to publish The Seasons to the
Mark Rose, Lecture, Copyright and Its Metaphors, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 5 (2002) (quoting
Daniel Defoe, Miscellanea, 16 DEFOE'S REvIEW 515 (Arthur Wellesley Secord ed., 1938)
(1710).
105. See FEATHER, supra note 49, at 68 (noting that "Itjhe 1710 Act, if anything, obfus-
cated rather than clarified the situation.").
106. See Rose, supra note 65, at 94 (noting that Scottish bookseller Alexander Donald-
son, who "specializ[ed] in inexpensive reprints of standard works whose copyright term
had expired," published a "a carefully argued pamphlet against perpetual copyright"
several years before his participation in the case of Donaldson v. Becket, 1 Eng. Rep. 837
(1774)).
107. Walterscheid, supra note 5, at 339.
108. For a general overview of how the courts came to adopt this position, see RosE,
supra note 65, at 49-66.
109. Locke himself objected to the concept of perpetual copyright. See id. at 33.
However, the reigning conception of literary property-that it could be willed and
deeded as though it were any other brand of property-demonstrates that in the popular
imagination, no qualitative difference existed between literary property and real and
personal property. See ROSE, supra note 65, at 17-18. But see PATTERSON, supra note 53,
at 75 (arguing that the transfer of a book was analogous to a negative covenant, rather
than an actual sale).
110. SAMUEL JOHNSON, WORKS OF THE ENGLISH POETS WITH PREFACES, BIOGRAPHICAL AND
CRITICAL (0. Nichols ed., 1779), available at http://www.hn.psu.edu/Faculty/KKem-
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plaintiff, London bookseller Andrew Millar,"' who promptly printed two
thousand copies, followed by a second printing of one thousand in
1763.112 Without permission from Millar, Scottish bookseller Robert Tay-
lor subsequently printed one thousand copies of The Seasons.1 13 Millar
sued Taylor in equity seeking an injunction and damages, demanding that
Taylor forfeit to him all unsold copies of his pirated version of The
Seasons. 114
Over twenty-eight years had elapsed since the original publication of
The Seasons, so that if the court found that no common law copyright
existed, this would enable Taylor or any other Brit to freely copy previously
published works upon the expiration of the statutory period. 115 On the
other hand, if the court held that there was a cause of action at common
law, notwithstanding the statute's restrictions, Millar and his heirs would
be entitled to a perpetual copyright. As framed by the Court of Chancery,
the question was whether the Statute of Anne constituted a new set of
rights protecting authorship, or simply codified an author's preexisting
rights. 116
The court was split-a highly unusual occurrence' 17-and the range
of opinions and arguments "still define the battle lines drawn to this
merer/poets/thomson/default.htm. Arguably, it was "uncannily appropriate" for The
Seasons to be the subject of the lawsuits that defined British copyright law, because
Thomson, having drawn inspiration for his poetry from his observations of nature, per-
fectly embodied the Lockean ideal. RoSE, supra note 65, at 113-14.
111. Millar alleged that he paid "valuable and full consideration" to retain all rights to
The Seasons "to him and his heirs and assigns for ever." Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep.
201, 203 (1769).
112. Id. at 202-03.
113. Id. at 203. For more on the strife between London and Scottish booksellers, see
RosE, supra note 65, at 69.
114. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 205, 256. Note that the case came to the King's Bench, a
law court, not as an appeal, but in order for them to advise the jury in equity on the legal
status of ownership of a copyright under the Statute of Anne. Id. at 204 ("But
whether ... the said Robert Taylor is liable in law to answer the damages sustained by
the said Andrew Millar .. .the jurors aforesaid are altogether ignorant; and therefore
pray the advice of the Court here.").
115. The Right of Publication, or the Right to Divulge, is one of the moral rights recog-
nized by the French. See Joffrain, supra note 22, at 762.
116. See Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 206. Specifically, the questions before the justices to
answer were "1st. Whether the copy of a book, or literary composition, belongs to the
author, by the common law: 2d. Whether the common law-right of authors to the copies
of their own works is taken away by [the Statute of Anne]." Id.
117. The opinion of Justice Yates, the lone dissenter, demonstrates how unusual his
position was: He wrote that his dissent "may seem to require some apology" for having
"taken up so much time," given that he had "the misfortune to be alone in" his opinion,
yet insisted that this was his "sincere opinion." Id. at 248. While disagreeing with Yates
on the outcome, Lord Mansfield himself emphasized that this was an unprecedented
deadlock amongst the justices: "This is the first instance of a final difference of opinion
in this Court, since I sat here. Every order, rule, judgment, and opinion, has hitherto
been unanimous .... In short, we have equally tried to convince, or be convinced: but,
in vain. We continue to differ." Id. at 250-51. Mansfield had served as the Chief Justice
of the King's Bench since 1756 (thirteen years prior to this case). For a biographical
summary of Mansfield, see William Murray (Lord Mansfield) 1705-1793, at http://
law.wlu.edu/faculty/history/brockenbrough/mansfield.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
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day." 1 18 Chief Justice Lord Mansfield, historically a staunch supporter of
authors' rights, led the majority in holding that the Statute of Anne did not
foreclose an author's common law property right. 119 Having framed the
question as "whether it is agreeable to natural principles, moral justice and
fitness" for an author to retain the same unlimited property right in his
work after publication as he possessed before publication, Mansfield began
by reasoning that "for ages" such a right had existed. 120 If the legislature
wanted to dissolve such a historic, natural right, Mansfield reasoned, it
would have expressly mentioned that in the text of the Statute.' 2 1
Justice Aston concurred with Mansfield and applied classic Lockean
theory, arguing that intellectual property was, for all practical purposes, no
different than tangible property, and that the author retained all ownership
rights in his work, even after publication: "Can it be conceived, that in
purchasing a literary composition at a shop, the purchaser ever thought he
bought the right to be the printer and seller of that specific work?"1 2 2
Aston recognized no difference between the labor exerted in erecting a wall
with one's hands, and that required to write a book; therefore, just as tres-
pass would lie if a stranger attempted to claim that wall as her own, so too
illicitly copying the contents of a previously published book would consti-
tute usurping another's labor:
[T]o deprive a man of the fruit of his own cares and sweat; and to enter upon
it... as if it was the effect of the intruder's pains and travel; is a most mani-
fest violation of truth: it is asserting, in fact, that to be his, which cannot be
his. ... [Ilt is incompatible with the peace and happiness of mankind, to
violate or disturb, by force or fraud, his possession, use or disposal of those
rights; as well as it is against the principles of reason, justice and truth.12 3
Justice Yates, in dissent,' 2 4 forcefully argued that the Statute of Anne
clearly limited the monopoly held by the owner of a literary work. Closely
examining the statute's language, he argued that the objective of the
twenty-eight year monopoly was to advance learning for the entire nation
118. Syn, supra note 56, at 5.
119. RosE, supra note 65, at 69, 78-82.
120. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 253.
121. Id. at 256.
122. Id. at 222.
123. Id. at 220 (internal quotations omitted). Justice Willes, also in concurrence, was
an even more emphatic proponent of a perpetual property right vested in the author or
his assigns. Willes could not countenance the specter of the masses shamelessly exploit-
ing an author's honest labor. "It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice," he opined,
"that a stranger should reap the beneficial pecuniary produce of another man's work."
Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
124. Interestingly, prior to becoming a judge, Justice Yates represented authors
against booksellers, whereas. Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice, defended booksellers'
interests. L. Ray Patterson, The DMCA: A Modern Version of the Licensing Act of 1662, 10
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33, 49 (2002). A commentator has argued that the booksellers pre-
vailed in Millar not on the strength of their legal argument, but because of Mansfield's
influence). Id. Given that the authors had already parted with any rights to their works,
the commentator argues that the booksellers' pretence of arguing on behalf of the
authors was so implausible that "the ultimate failure of their quest ... for a perpetual
common law copyright" is not surprising. Id.
Vol. 38
2005 French and Anglo-American Natural Rights
by nourishing "the genius of the nation. 1 2 5 Since a perpetual copyright
would suffocate the dissemination of knowledge by placing onerous
prohibitions on unlicensed copying, 12 6 "[t]he design of the statute [must
have been] to vest a temporary copy-right in authors, and to establish that
right for a limited time." 127 Though temporarily defeated, Yates's opinion
later formed the theoretical basis for future British and American copyright
law.
Millar demonstrates that, while protecting the moral rights of an
author was a policy concern that might provide guidance to courts in search
of equitable judgments, these rights did not exist as separate causes of
action unto themselves. Mansfield was decidedly unsettled by the prospect
of greedy, careless infringers usurping works from an amorphous public
domain, and "perpetuat[ing] the imperfections, to the disgrace and against
the will of the author[.]" 128 However, while he certainly felt that the repu-
tation of an author had intrinsic value, and that damage to that reputation
was an additional reason why the Statute of Anne should not eradicate
common law property rights, he by no means proposed that a damaged
reputation could form the basis of a claim in copyright.
Justice Yates, meanwhile, actually employed the phrase "moral rights"
on several occasions, and labeled it "the most specious"'1 2 9 of all of Millar's
arguments. However, he did not repudiate moral rights on the ground that
they did not constitute a valid cause of action, but rather because he felt
that the damage that would result should the property rights of owners of
literary works terminate was subordinate to the interests advanced by the
Statute of Anne, and therefore irrelevant.130
Thus, Lord Mansfield and Justice Yates did ultimately agree in two
respects: First, they would each hold that if a natural right to literary prop-
erty did in fact exist, that right would only be actionable by the work's legal
owner. Thus, for example, were Ann Author to sell the rights to her novel
to Bob Bookseller, and Bob carelessly printed the novel so that it was rid-
125. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 246, 250.
126. Id. at 250.
127. Id. at 247.
128. Id. at 252.
129. See generally id. at 229-50.
130. Id. at 231 (rejecting the moral rights argument as being subservient to the statu-
tory restrictions) (emphasis added). Justice Yates argued:
Mr. Blackstone [plaintiffs counsel] observed that ...literary compositions,
being the produce of the author's own labour and abilities, he has a moral and
equitable right to the profits they produce; and is fairly intitled to these profits
for ever; and that if others usurp or encroach upon these moral rights, they are
evidently guilty of injustice, in pirating the profits of another's labour, and reap-
ing where they have not sown.
This argument has indeed a captivating sound; it strikes the passions with a
winning address: but it will be found as fallacious as the rest, and equally begs
the very question in dispute. For, the injustice it suggests, depends upon the
extent and duration of the author's property; as it is the violation of that prop-
erty that must alone constitute the injury .... In that case, the defendant can-
not be charged with any injustice; but has merely exercised a legal right."
599
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dled with typographical errors, Ann would have no cause of action against
Bob under copyright law (though she might under contract), because she
would already have transferred to Bob all the sticks in the property bundle.
Second, Mansfield and Yates would concur that moral and equitable con-
cerns in copyright law are only relevant in policy considerations and are
not autonomous bases for imposing liability.
3. Donaldson v. Becket
For five years, the printers had their cake and ate it, too: the Statute of
Anne granted them printing monopolies lasting up to twenty-eight years,
and Millar assured them a perpetual property interest in their literary prop-
erty even after the statutory period had expired, but whatever exuberance
they felt was short-lived. In 1774, the seminal House of Lords decision in
Donaldson v. Becket 13 1 severed natural law from copyright, reversing Millar
and vindicating Justice Yates. In Donaldson, copyright law was revolution-
ized, once again, in a fight over James Thomson's poetry. In a nutshell,
following his victory in Millar, Andrew Millar's heirs sold the rights to sev-
eral of Thomson's poems to Thomas Becket and another group of London
printers in an estate sale. 13 2 The new owners immediately filed an injunc-
tion to halt the illicit publishing of The Seasons by Scotsman Alexander
Donaldson, and, based on Millar, the Court of Chancery granted the
injunction. 133 However, Donaldson had recently won a similar action
involving his unauthorized printing of Stackhouse's Bible in Scotland's own
Court of Session, which was not bound by British common law and clearly
more favorable to promoting the interests of Scottish printers. 134
Donaldson then used his Stackhouse victory as leverage and appealed
the Becket decision to Britain's highest court, the House of Lords, whose
thirty-three members 135 summoned an advisory panel of the twelve com-
mon law judges 13 6 from the King's Bench, Court of Common Pleas, 137 and
the Exchequer. The Lords submitted a series of five questions to the advi-
sory panel to help guide them in resolving the dispute.138 The first ques-
tion was whether authors had an exclusive right to be the first to print and
131. Donaldson v. Becket, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 837-49 (1774).
132. RoSE, supra note 65, at 95. In a turn of events that would provide a perfect
ending to a Victorian novel, Millar died on the day after the completion of oral argu-
ments in Millar v. Taylor, and the justices announced that they would defer deciding the
case until the next term. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep at 201-02. Then, Millar's heirs sold Thom-
son's poems to Beckett at auction for £505, a hefty profit on the £105 he had paid 40
years earlier. Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. at 838.
133. RosE, supra note 65, at 95.
134. See id.
135. The House of Lords actually "decided cases by a general vote of... lawyers and
laymen alike." Id. at 97. The twelve common law judges would "hear the arguments of
counsel and ... give their advice on matters of law, after which the peers would debate
the issue and vote." Id. at 97-98.
136. However, only twelve judges decided the case, as Lord Mansfield, "[flor reasons
known only to him," did not take part in the vote. Walterscheid, supra note 5, at 344.
137. For an insightful discussion about the origins of this intermingling of Parliament
and the judiciary, see id. at 340-44.
138. See RosE, supra note 65, at 98.
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publish their works and whether they could enforce this right against any-
one who did so without their permission. 13 9 The advisory judges found, 8
to 3, that under the common law, authors did have such a right. 140 The
second question was whether authors could pursue legal remedies against
infringers even after publication, and the judges found 7 to 4 that they
could.' 41 The crucial third question was whether the Statute of Anne dis-
placed the common law cause of action or authors retained a perpetual
property right in a copyrighted work despite statutory limitations.14 2 The
advisory judges found that authors did retain such a right, echoing the
Millar majority.
However, the Lords rejected the panel's advice on the third question,
and held, by a substantial 22 to 11 margin, that post-publication common
law property rights never existed in thefirst place, and that therefore Statute
of Anne's maximum twenty-eight year term was in fact the only legal pro-
tection to which authors were entitled. 14 3 By extension, the Donaldson
decision excluded the possibility of moral rights based on common law.
Even had the Lords agreed with the panel of judges and held that copyright
encompasses both a common law and statutory rights, there is still no indi-
cation that British jurists contemplated even a nascent conception of moral
rights. Thus, in 1774, on the eve of the American Declaration of Indepen-
dence, even the most robust reading of Britain's conception of natural law
authors' rights paralleled the classic Lockean formulation of property
rights, according to which all property interests instantly terminate with
the transfer to a new owner. True, even after an author sold a copyright, he
still possessed residual interests in the integrity of his work, but certainly
even those interests no longer existed upon the expiration of the monop-
oly. As will be seen in Part III, a work's entrance into the public domain
did little to deprive French authors' ability to claim moral rights violations.
II. "In Pride of Youth, and Felt Through Nature's Depth"; 14 4 Or,
United States Copyright Comes of Age
A. The Constitution
Locke's labor theory of property was more immediately applicable
within the British colonies of the New World than in post-feudal Europe,
because the prospect of expansion into unclaimed virgin territory provided
many opportunities for people to mix his labor with nature. 145 In fact,
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 98. The result of the vote for the third question is mired in controversy.
For a discussion of the evidence that the vote actually was in favor of artists' rights,
despite the way it is recorded in the official reports, see RosE, supra note 65, at 154-58.
But see, e.g., Syn, supra note 56, at 6 (determining that "the judges concluded, six to five,
that the statute extinguished such rights when a work was published") (emphasis
added).
143. Id. at 6 n.31.
144. THOMSON, supra note 1, at 43.
145. See Garon, supra note 26, at 1294.
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prior to the adoption of the Constitution, twelve colonies had adopted cop-
yright statutes of their own,14 6 many of which included language combin-
ing a limited monopoly to promote learning and recognition of natural
rights. 147
Notably, all twelve of these colonies provided for statutory copyright
limits, either identical or similar to those in the Statute of Anne. 148 It is
reasonable then to assume that the colonies had the same purpose in mind:
to employ copyright as a catalyst to spur creativity for the public good by
granting authors limited monopolies over their work.14 9 In short, "all of
the ideas [in the colonies] originated in the English history of copy-
right."150 Thus, even if a number of colonies linked copyright to natural
rights, there is no indication that they construed those rights to extend to
post-publication moral rights claims.151
When the Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution, their purpose in
including the Copyright Clause 15 2 was to implement, as the British had, a
146. Marvin Ammori, Note, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HAuv. J.L. &
TECH. 287, 306 (2002). Those statutes would be superseded by the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution.
147. See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 528 (1990).
148. Ammori, supra note 146, at 306-07.
149. Id. at 307. For example, New Hampshire's statute read as follows:
As the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, and the advance-
ment of human happiness, greatly depend on the efforts of learned and inge-
nious persons in the various arts and sciences; as the principal encouragement
such persons can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature,
must consist in the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to
themselves; and as such security is one of the natural rights of all men, there
being no property more peculiarly a man's own than that which is produced by
the labor of his mind ....
Yen, supra note 147, at 528.
150. Assafa Endeshaw, Commentary: A Critical Assessment of the U.S. -China Conflict
on Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 295, 301 (1996) (quoting PArERSON,
supra note 53, at 180).
151. But see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolu-
tionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 999-1000 (1990). As evidence that
early American and French copyright law was based, in part, on similar considerations,
Ginsburg argues that "[slources shortly predating the Constitution ... indicate Ameri-
can acknowledgement of authors' personal claims." Id. One such claim involved Noah
Webster, who sought stronger copyright protection for his schoolbooks on the basis that
"Imlen of industry or of talents in any way, have a right to the property of their produc-
tions." Noah Webster, Origin of the Copy-Right Laws in the United States, in A COL-LEC-
TION OF PAPERS ON POLITICAL, LITERARY AND MORAL SUBJECTS 173-74 (B. Franklin ed., Burt
Franklin 1968) (1843). However, even if this were the case, it cannot be presumed that
the colonies would have entertained the possibility that an author, after selling and pub-
lishing a work, would have a claim under copyright law to protect, for example, the integ-
rity of her work, much less a right of retraction, whereby a work could theoretically be
removed from the public domain. See Garon, supra note 26, at 1303 (arguing that
"[w]ith regard to the right to withdraw a copyrighted work from the marketplace, how-
ever, the rift between economic rights and natural rights would prove absolute").
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Clause authorized Congress to pass legislation
"[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
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"public benefit rationale for copyright protection." 15 3 Additionally, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that James Madison, having approved of the deci-
sion in Millar and possibly not yet aware of its reversal in Donaldson,
advocated authors' rights as a competing interest.' 5 4 In Federalist Number
43, Madison wrote that the "copyright of authors has been solemnly
adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law."'1 5 The Constitu-
tion's vagueness reflected the Framers' own uncertainty as to whether a
perpetual common law property right in copyright could exist alongside a
statutory monopoly: the Copyright Clause empowered Congress to legis-
late in the field of copyright, but did not delineate the effect of such a
statute on the common law.1 56 Congress defined the scope of that monop-
oly in the Copyright Act of 1790, mirroring the Statute of Anne and grant-
ing authors a maximum of two distinct fourteen-year terms of
monopoly, 15 7 but because of the Founding Fathers' vagueness, nearly half
a century passed during which ambiguity persisted as to whether the com-
mon law copyright could coexist with the Copyright Act's statutory
framework. 158
B. Wheaton and Beyond
The 1834 Supreme Court case of Wheaton v. Peters, which paralleled
the House of Lords' decision in Donaldson, held conclusively that the Copy-
right Act superseded authors' common law rights.' 5 9 According to Profes-
sor Garon, "[t]he Court readily recognized the natural right in an author's
work, but further held that the statute divested the right upon publication,
in favor of the statutory scheme."'160 In this way, the Court acknowledged
U.S. copyright's grounding in Lockean natural rights, but also held that
those rights were overriden by the Copyright Act's statutory limitations.
16 1
Writing for the majority, Justice McLean stated:
That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and may
obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or by improperly
obtaining a copy endeavours to realize a profit by its publication, cannot be
doubted; but this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual
and exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the author
shall have published it to the world.
The argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the product of his
labour as any other member of society, cannot be controverted. And the
answer is, that he realizes this product by the transfer of his manuscripts, or
153. Dallon, supra note 3, at 423.
154. SAUNDERS, supra note 92, at 150-51; Yen, supra note 147, at 529.
155. Yen, supra note 147, at 529 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (J. Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
156. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 11 (2002).
157. Ginsburg, supra note 151, at 1001.
158. See SAUNDERS, supra note 92, at 151.
159. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591.
160. Garon, supra note 26, at 1299,
161. Id.
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in the sale of his works, when first published. 162
So there it was. U.S. courts would henceforth accept no copyright
claims arising from anything other than federal copyright acts and the
Constitution, and therefore any expansion of copyright protection necessa-
rily had to come from Congressional action. 16 3 Since Wheaton, Congress
and the courts have repeatedly treated copyright as a creature of positive
law. 164 Professor Patterson notes that this policy preference, which echoed
throughout U.S. history, is necessary to retain the Founders' calibration of
competing interests: "If copyright is an example of natural law property,
the rights will be weighted in favor of the copyright holder; if copyright is a
marketing monopoly, the rights will be more evenly balanced among
author, publisher, and user."165
Perhaps the quintessential expression of the anti-natural rights senti-
ment came in the form of the 1909 Copyright Act, which, in extending the
author's monopoly to two twenty-eight year terms, clarified that "the object
of all legislation must be... to promote science and the useful arts[,]... not
primarily for the benefit of the author .... -166 Turning to natural rights,
Congress reiterated that "[tihe enactment of copyright legislation by Con-
gress under the term of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right
that the author has in his writing."' 6 7 In this environment, the evolution of
a set of moral rights based on natural law was not judicially feasible and
would have been contrary to express legislative intent, because positive
copyright law, which aims primarily at protecting the public interest, is the
inverse to natural law copyright, which focuses on protecting the author's
interests. It is to the concept of natural law copyright as it developed in
France that this Note now turns.
III. "Who Can Number up His Labours?"'168 Or, the Dual Evolution
of French Copyright
A. Authors' Rights in Late Medieval France
Moral rights in France can be traced back to a series of judicial deci-
sions in the mid-nineteenth century and reflect the great influence on the
French psyche of Emmanuel Kant's philosophy, which viewed artists'
162. Id. at 1298-99 (quoting Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657).
163. See Garon, supra note 26, at 1299 (arguing that "[t]he direct consequence of
Wheaton should not be to reject the natural rights approach from U.S. copyright juris-
prudence, but rather to recognize that these rights can be statutorily reframed, though
not extinguished").
164. Strowel, supra note 16, at 244.
165. L. Ray Patterson, Nimmer's Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: A Comment, 38
Hous. L. REv. 431, 434 (2001).
166. Walterscheid, supra note 5, at 383-84 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 60-2222 (1909),
reprinted in MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, app. 13-1 to
13-31, 13-10 (1999).
167. Strowel, supra note 16, at 244-245 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIM-
MER,, 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, iv, app. 13-9) (1992) (emphasis added).
168. JAMES THOMSON, A Poem Sacred to the Memory of Sir Isaac Newton, in 2 THOMSON'S
POETICAL WORKS 175, 179 (London, Bell and Daldy Fleet Street 1866).
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rights as grounded in personality rights rather than in traditional property
rights. 16 9 By the mid-twentieth century, German philosopher Joseph
Kohler's theory that creative works generate personality rights that are
either patrimonial, that is granted by the state, or moral, reinforced the
trend in French jurisprudence that favored granting ever-stronger moral
rights to authors. 170 In 1957, the French Parliament legitimated the
groundswell of support for moral rights by passing legislation protecting
the rights of paternity, disclosure, withdrawal, and integrity. 17 1
However, looking back through the warped glass of history, France's
author-centric approach seems to date back much farther than the nine-
teenth century. While it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the concept of
a natural law copyright first emerged, 17 2 it is clear that French authors
were far more active in asserting moral rights than their British counter-
parts, and did so as early as at the turn of the sixteenth century. In her
research on the evolving authorial voice in the late fifteenth and early six-
teenth century French texts, Professor Brown demonstrates that several
French authors relied on the courts to vindicate their moral rights when
they argued that their works had been violated in some significant respect,
and that the courts consistently upheld their claims. 173 Brown points to
evidence of a "sustained effort on the part of... writers to protect their
works through lawsuit[s]... as early as the first decade of the sixteenth
century."17 4 While prior to 1710, British authors never opposed the pre-
vailing property regime, which required that they cede all rights in their
works following the initial sale to the buyer of their manuscript, late medie-
val French rhetoriqueurs (poet-historians) recognized "their inherent rights
to their own words" and joined together in challenging infringing print-
ers-both in and out of court.175
The first known lawsuit involving a French author was initiated in
1504 by Andre de la Vigne, who sued printer Michel le Noir for attempting
169. See, e.g., Liemer, supra note 19, at 42; Rosen, supra note 4, at 157; Suhl, supra
note 20, at 1208.
170. Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protec-
tion of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 27-28 & n.31 (1988) ("Although
[Kohler] agreed with Kant, Gareis, and Gierke in viewing a work as the expression of the
author's personality, he also recognized a property aspect to a work: its economic
value.").
171. Id. at 6-7 (discussing CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.]. art. 543, CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] arts.
425-29 (Law of March 11, 1957 on literary and artistic property). This departure from
what Mitchel Lasser calls the "official French portrait" of a passive judge mechanically
applying statutes to cases is actually a frequent-though rarely admitted-occurrence in
French jurisprudence. See generally Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits:
Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325 (1995). Lasser argues
that French judges are frequently influenced by academic authorities in shaping their
jurisprudence, and feel that it is their duty to step in and provide guidance when there
are gaps in the law. Id. at 1344-46, 1408.
172. SAUNDFRs, supra note 92, at 77-78.
173. See generally CYNTHIA M. BROWN, POETS, PATRONS, AND PRINTERS: CRISIS OF
AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL FRANCE (1995) (discussing the relationship between French
authors and the judicial system).
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id. at 3-4.
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to reproduce his Vergier d'honneur without his permission. De la Vigne
had previously retained the services of printer Pierre le Dru to publish two
editions of Vergier d'honneur and did not take kindly to le Noir's attempt to
derive a windfall from de la Vigne's labor.1 76 Brown also submits that "[iut
is likely that he challenged le Noir for moral reasons... calling into ques-
tion the printer's right to publish his writings without his consent."'1 77 The
court decided in favor of the author, granting him a one-year monopoly
over the printing of Vergier d'honneur, after which the work would enter
into the public domain. 178
Already the French experience diverges significantly from that of the
British. English cases, such as Donaldson and Millar, typically involved
various combinations of booksellers and printers fighting over property
rights to books that had long since left their authors' hands.1 79 However, it
was the author de la Vigne, not the printer le Dru, who sued le Noir in this
case, and it was to de la Vigne, not le Dru that the court granted the one-
year monopoly of printing. 180
The experience of another French author, Jean Bouchet, is also inter-
esting in its invocation of a number of themes related to modern moral
rights.18 1 In 1503 and 1504, in what would today be grounds for a moral
rights hat trick involving the rights of divulgation, attribution, and integ-
rity, printers Antoine Wrard182 and le Noir published Bouchet's work,
Regnars traversant les perilleuses voyes des folles fiances du monde
("Regnars"), before Bouchet had completed revising it (violating Bouchet's
right to divulgation); displayed the name of better-known author Sebastian
Brantin instead of Bouchet's on the title page (violating Bouchet's right to
attribution); and printed it with numerous errors and unauthorized inser-
tions and deletions (violating Bouchet's right to integrity).18 3 Incensed,
Bouchet blasted the printers in a later writing, accusing them of being
"more interested in filling up their purses than in their honor or mine", and
176. Id. at 3, 18-19.
177. Id. at 19.
178. Id.
179. While Saunders argues that, "[iun France as in England, a rhetoric of the author's
right in literary property was a routine instrument of publishers' interests," he does not
explain why only French authors took an active interest in defending their own rights as
well. SAUNDERS, supra note 92, at 83 (emphasis added).
180. See BROWN, supra note 173, at 19. Brown points out that de La Vigne likely had
something to gain by winning an injunction against le Noir, since French authors often
received compensation derived from the printing of their works. Id. In contrast, English
authors of the same period were only paid once-when they delivered the manuscript-
and "depended upon [their] bookseller's' generosity." See RANSOM, supra note 2, at 34
(stating "in the reign of Elizabeth, hack writers were seldom paid twice").
181. See BROWN, supra note 173, at 21-28.
182. VerArd is historically significant, being the first Frenchman to be awarded an
exclusive rights privilege, in 1507. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 H~Av. L. REv. 281,
292 n.42 (1970). Then-Professor Breyer included this detail in his article to demon-
strate that printers were originally the beneficiaries of early copyright protection, to the
exclusion of authors' interests. Id. at 292.
183. BROWN, supra note 173, at 21-23.
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setting the record straight by informing his readers that the printers had
"found a way to take some of my short compositions[,] printed them incor-
rectly[,] and devised their own title for them."'184
Bouchet subsequently sued Verard on the grounds that Vrard had
added material from another work in his edition of Regnars and won his
case "based on the argument that a publisher did not have the right to
tamper with an author's words."18 5 Even after this settlement, Bouchet
kept up the attack, labeling printers "repressors of poets," ridiculing their
carelessness in converting manuscript to print, and denouncing their inju-
rious and offensive practice of corrupt[ing] the ideas of the writer in a later
work. 186
This sequence of events is noteworthy in several respects: First, it dem-
onstrates that Bouchet felt deeply violated by Vrard, not merely due to the
economic impact of his infringement, but also because of the damage
inflicted on his reputation. Second, Bouchet clearly had modes of recourse
that British writers did not have. Unlike his British counterparts, who were
compelled to publish their works with the royally sanctioned Stationers'
Company, which was authorized to censor any inflammatory material,
Bouchet could speak out in his own interest, inside and outside of court.
Third, Bouchet's actions show that he viewed himself as "the originator of a
literary text," and not simply one cog in the publishing wheel. 187
The argument in favor of an early division of printers' (economic)
rights and authors' (moral) rights is clearest in the case of Jean Lemaire. 188
In 1504, le Noir pirated Lemaire's book, Temple d'honneur et de vertus,
from Wrard, to whom Lemaire had granted publishing rights. The unau-
thorized printing was replete with misspellings.' 8 9 Therefore, in the title
page of his next book, Legende des Venitiens, Lemaire strategically included
on the title page the full text of the three-year royal privilege, which granted
Lemaire exclusive publishing rights to his work and which he had obtained
from the king, in effect daring unscrupulous printers to cross him
again. 190 He also made clear that he had personally published Legende des
Venitiens with his own money, and that he therefore retained full owner-
ship of the work.19 1 In sum, Lemaire's message could be interpreted as a
broadcast to the world that he possessed economic rights to his book and
that he would take action if his moral rights were violated.
Granted, not all French authors were able to protect their works in the
same way as de la Vigne, Bouchet, and Lemaire. These authors were part of
an elite: each had royal backing and was likely able to protect his moral
184. Id. at 23, 25.
185. Id. at 27.
186. Id. at 27.
187. Id. at 28.
188. See id. at 41-53.
189. Even the original author's name was butchered-le Noir transformed 'Jean
Lemaire" into "Jehan le Maistre" on the title page. Id. at 48.
190. See id. at 49-51.
191. Id. at 52.
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rights to an extent that lesser-known authors was not.192 However, many
British authors were also beneficiaries of special printing privileges and
patronage relationships until the civil war in 1640.193 Why were they
mostly absent from courtrooms until the eighteenth century, when English
author Alexander Pope began making regular appearances? 194 And why
did early French authors feel entitled to defend what they considered their
inherent rights-both economic and noneconomic-without any legislation
to guide them, 195 while British authors only began entering the courtroom
after the Statute of Anne explicitly granted them a positive right?1
9 6
None of these questions have easy answers; however, eliminating the
experiences of sixteenth century French authors from inquiries into the
origin of moral rights skews the empirical data and the conclusions that
one can draw from that data. 19 7
B. The Legacy of the French Revolution
The French Revolution of 1789, led by antireligious and antimonarchi-
cal forces, was influenced by the dual manifestos of the American Declara-
tion of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen. These documents stirred the populace to rise up against the
remnants of feudalism and install a government that would recognize
man's natural rights to life, liberty, and property. 198 For the first time, any
man could "move laterally and vertically in society[,] a reaction against the
tendency under feudalism to fix a man in a place and status."' 9 9 Citizens
of post-revolutionary France glorified secularism and were confident that,
in the Age of Reason, they could sweep away preexisting laws, which
favored a rigidly hierarchical class structure, and replace them with new
laws, "rationally derived from unimpeachable first principles. '20 0 One of
those principles was artistic autonomy. 20 '
Prior to the French Revolution, the monarch-"God's earthly represen-
tative"-controlled the form and dissemination of cultural symbols.
20 2 It
192. See Swack, supra note 39, at 369-70.
193. ROSE, supra note 65, at 16-17.
194. See id. at 59.
195. See Peeler, supra note 21, at 429 (noting that France enacted its first copyright
law in 1793).
196. See ROSE, supra note 65, at 59 (noting that in 1729, John Gay was the first
English author to go to court, although Alexander Pope was the first "to make regular
and repeated use of the statute").
197. For an example of an approach grounded in nineteenth-century French jurispru-
dence, see Charles A. Marvin, The Author's Status in the United Kingdom and France:
Common Law and the Moral Right Doctrine, 20 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 675 (1971). Even
Calvin D. Peeler, who claims to have traced the judicial origins of French moral rights
back to the earliest cases where these rights were articulated, begins his inquiry in the
eighteenth century. See Peeler, supra note 21, at 427-33.
198. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION : AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 15 (1969).
199. Id. at 17.
200. Id. at 16.
201. See generally Peeler, supra note 21, at 429.
202. Id. at 426.
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was he who granted authors literary privileges, and he expected their
works to magnify his fame and express his personality. 20 3 These writings
and other works of art became obvious targets for revolutionaries, who
called for the destruction of the ancient regime. 204 The individual was
thrust to the forefront, and works of art were presented as "examples of the
free spirit. ' 205 In 1793, Parliament passed the first French copyright act,
modeled after the Statute of Anne.
However, the apparent transplant of the economic rights embodied in
the Statute of Anne does not signify that the French struck the same bal-
ance between the public good and an author's incentive as the British or
the Americans. Soon after the Act's passage, the French Minister of Justice
delivered an oratory to an assembly of magistrates in which he admonished
them to always remember that literary property was not "less sacred than
other properties in the eyes of the republican magistrate." 20 6 Could it be
that, like Madison, the Minister of Justice had not yet read the House of
Lords' decision in Donaldson v. Becket?20 7 That may be one reason, but
more importantly, his words demonstrate that the French viewed the arts
far differently than the British. While the British intended their copyright
statute to promote the public interest, the French saw monopoly as a
means by which to increase the prominence of French culture in the
world.208 "O]ur art,. . . our tastes,. . . our genius,. . . our glory," said the
Minister of Justice, all spring from artists, "who render all nations tributa-
ries."209 The public interest was less important than "grant[ing] the most
constant protection to the properties of works of the mind. ' 210 The newly
unified nation adored the creative genius of its authors, and judges soon
felt compelled to protect the interests of the state's cultural heroes. 211
Far from holding that the copyright act abolished preexisting rights,
French judges enshrined copyright's natural law origin into their jurispru-
dence.212 While owners of property inherited from prerevolutionary royal
privileges were routinely stripped of their holdings, courts carved out an
exception for literary works. 213 In the foundational case of Veuve Buffon C.
Boehmer,214 two years after the Revolution, the French Supreme Court
used natural rights language to quash 215 a lower-court ruling that had sub-
203. See id.
204. Id. at 428-29.
205. Id. at 429.
206. Id. at 431.
207. See Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (marking the turning point in British copyright
jurisprudence).
208. See id. at 431-32.
209. Id. at 432.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 437-41.
213. Id. at 438-39.
214. 3 Journal du Palais, 415.
215. Because French courts were prohibited from "making" law, courts of appeal did
not have the right to "decide" cases on their own; they could merely "quash" lower court
decisions and attempt to direct the lower court to decide the question differently the
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ordinated literary property rights to common property rights.2 16 By 1826,
in the case of Muller C. Guibal,2 17 the French Court officially placed liter-
ary property on an equal footing with traditional categories of property. In
1875, the courts rejected the argument that literary property was nothing
more than a privilege created by the legislature, and instead determined
that it constituted a real property right. 2 18 French authors now were pro-
tected both by statutory monopoly and natural rights, an abundance of
security that Anglo-American authors rarely enjoyed. At this point, how-
ever, both protections constituted parallel systems of economic rights-they
were alienable and expired at the end of the statutory term.
The mid-nineteenth century also found French courts holding that
authors retained property interests even in the absence of statutory protec-
tion, a trend that culminated in the solidification of a moral rights regime.
The first significant step on this evolutionary path came in an 1839 ruling
by the Royal Court of Rouen,2 19 In that case, strikingly similar to the facts
of Wheaton v. Peters,220 the court held that an author's failure to comply
with the Copyright Act's deposit requirement precluded him from pursu-
ing a statutory remedy, but "did not negate an author's inherent rights in
his work because literary property was a pre- existing and natural right of
the author."' 22 1 This was followed by an 1875 judgment 2 22 in which a
French court held that the natural law property right existed in
perpetuity.2 23 Together, the 1839 and 1875 rulings meant that because an
author's literary property rights were fundamental and not mere products
of a copyright statute, certain infringement claims were viable for
perpetuity irrespective of the statutory term and procedural require-
ments.2 24 As Wheaton demonstrated, jurisdictions recognizing only eco-
nomic copyright, like the United States, would completely bar such
claims. 2 25
Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, French courts contin-
ued to expand the scope of noneconomic rights 226 to include (1) the right
next time. SeeJOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 377-79 (1968). Because opin-
ions officially did not have any precedential value, the lower court could choose to
ignore the court of appeal's wishes and reissue the original lower court decision. Id.
Eventually, France somewhat limited these ping-pong matches, and in any case, it often
was in the lower court's best interest to "get it right" the second time around. Id. at
378-79.
216. Peeler, supra note 21, at 438-39.
217. 20 Journal du Palais 237.
218. Peeler, supra note 21, at 440-41 (discussing CA Seine, Feb. 3, 1875, D. P. 1875,
II, 148, 148 nn.2-3.
219. CA Rouen, ler ch., Dec. 10, 1839, D.P. 1839, II, 74-75.
220. For a discussion of Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), see infra Part
II.B.
221. Peeler, supra note 21, at 446.
222. Chapsal & Noel C. Simon, 24 Journal du Palais, 1224.
223. Peeler, supra note 21, at 441.
224. See id. at 441, 445-46.
225. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 664-65.
226. When French judges began to base protections on natural rights, French courts,
which, to begin with, ruled with a great deal more latitude than might be expected of a
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of attribution, which "gives the artist the right to have her name accurately
associated with her work";2 27 (2) the right of integrity, which "protects the
integrity of the art work itself and, indirectly, the creative process and art-
ist's reputation... prevent[ing] anyone from modifying the art without the
artist's permission... even after the artist has transferred ownership in the
work and/or copyright to someone else";2 28 (3) the right of disclosure,
which means that "[oinly the artist may determine when she has finished a
work and when she will disclose it to others";2 29 and (4) the right of with-
drawal, "the flip side to the right of disclosure," which means that "the
artist has the right to withdraw her work if she decides to do so [and] may
require the possessor to return the work to her so she can change it or even
destroy it."2 3 0 The broadening of moral rights law necessarily lessened the
importance of the public domain's statutory rights, so that by the time the
French Supreme Court ruled that "[iun a conflict of interest between the
public domain on [the] one hand and the authors or their heirs on the
other hand, we always lean in favor of the latter,"'23 1 the decision likely did
not raise many eyebrows along the Seine River.
IV. "But Hark! Methinks I Hear a Warning Voice," 23 2 Or, the
Encroachment on American Copyright Law
A. Berne and Moral Rights Legislation
The United States' foray into moral rights was by no means a willing
one. Not only did its judges refuse to recognize moral rights claims, but its
historic opposition to droit d'auteur caused it to refrain from signing onto
any international intellectual property treaty that conferred moral rights.
That included the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works ("Berne Convention"), 23 3 enacted in 1886 and amended in
1928 to include article 6bis, which protects an author's rights of attribu-
tion and integrity:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the trans-
fer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of,
or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
civil law court, became even less constrained by statutes. See generally Lasser, supra
note 171, at 1325 (demonstrating that behind the "official portrait" of the French judge
lies a complex dialectic by which the judge frequently departs from and returns to the
formalist language of the French legal opinion as a means of organizing and regulating
policy considerations).
227. Liemer, supra note 19, at 47; see alsoJoffrain, supra note 22, at 768-70 (discuss-
ing the right of attribution in French courts).
228. Liemer, supra note 19, at 50.
229. Id. at 52-53.
230. Id. at 54.
231. Cass. crim., May 28, 1875, D.P. 1875, I, 328-29 nn.1-2 (emphasis added).
232. THOMSON, supra note 1, at 180.
233. Berne Convention, supra note 20.
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(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding para-
graph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the
economic rights .... 234
It was perhaps inevitable that the premier multinational copyright
treaty23 5 would incorporate moral rights into its framework. According to
David Miller, "[tjhe British positivist view that copyrights are created by
state law suggests that copyrights exist only within state borders."2 36 By
contrast, the continental perspective that authors' rights originate in nature
implied an existence beyond a country's borders. 2 37 While these distinc-
tions mattered little in the domestically oriented early days of copyright,
they grew in significance when cross-border infringement became a com-
monplace occurrence, necessitating a multinational enforcement mecha-
nism.23 8 Napoleonic expansion in the early nineteenth century brought
authors' rights to Belgium and Holland, and influenced legal developments
in Italy and Switzerland; when the time came to devise an international
copyright treaty, the French paradigm naturally predominated.
23 9
The United States refrained from agreeing to Berne in part due to its
opposition to the treaty's moral rights language, 2 40 but economic interests
eventually prevailed. President Ronald Reagan's pullout from the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had
diminished the United States' influence over U.C.C. enforcement. 24 1 Also,
pirates were increasingly sapping profits from U.S. cultural exports, and
"the world leader in the exportation of copyrighted works... thus had a
strong interest in doing whatever it could to limit the market of interna-
tional piracy jeopardizing U.S. copyright holders' creations. '2 42 Running
out of options, the United States had little choice but to become a signatory
nation to Berne, and so in 1988 it signed on to the Convention through the
Berne Convention Implementation Act. 24 3 However, the congressional
Implementation Act refused to adopt the terms of Article 6bis, and thereby
denied authors the right to "claim authorship of the work; or to object to
any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the work, that would prejudice the author's honor or
reputation."24 4 At the same time, the United States claimed that moral
rights statutes were superfluous, because even in the absence of a federal
234. Id., at art. 6bis.
235. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights, supra note 151, at 1069. Approximately 125
nations are now members of the Berne Convention. Miller, supra note 75, at 250.
236. Miller, supra note 75, at 249.
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 248-49.
240. See Antezana, supra note 30, at 424, 426.
241. See Miller, supra note 75, at 244.
242. Id.; Antezana, supra note 30, at 429.
243. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2(1), (2),
102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
244. Id. § 3(b).
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statute, existing U.S. law sufficiently protected authors' rights.245 Given
that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), the Berne Convention's sole enforcement mechanism, did not
incorporate article 6bis, the United States' ambivalence toward moral rights
did not figure to lead to exposure for liability.
2 46
Nevertheless, the United States did purport to comply with its Berne
Convention obligations, at least in a minimalist sense, 247 when in 1990
Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA"), 248 which prom-
ised visual artists limited moral rights of attribution and integrity. 24 9
VARA represents the United States' only attempt to legislate moral rights in
accordance with the Berne Convention. 250 Although the scope of the pro-
tection is limited-VARA does not extend to literary works, it is only effec-
tive during the life of the creator, and some of its protections only cover
works of "recognized stature"25 1-some heralded the signing VARA as a
"startling breakthrough" 25 2 and a "significant legislative enactment" that
"embraced... considerations about the personality of the artists much like
those found in the French moral rights."2 53 However, American courts
have been generally unsympathetic to the moral rights claims of the few
plaintiffs who charge them with construing the statute. 25 4 During its four-
teen-year existence, VARA has generated about two published decisions per
year, of which plaintiffs have won only a handful. 255 In comparison with
the amount of ink that commentators have spilled on its behalf, the meager
judicial trickle that VARA has generated speaks far more loudly about its
ultimate significance.
245. Vera Zlatarski, "Moral" Rights and Other Moral Interests: Public Art Law in France,
Russia, and the United States, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 201, 217 (1999).
246. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994, Annex 1C,
MTN/FA/Corr.1, 33 l.L.M. 13 (1994); Joffrain, supra note 22, at 751; Tyler T. Ochoa,
Amicus Brief. Introduction: Rights of Attribution, Section 43(A) of the Lanham Act, and the
Copyright Public Domain, 24 WHITTIER L. REv. 911, 927 (2003) ("The exception was
insisted upon by the United States, for the obvious reason that U.S. officials knew that
we were not in compliance with Article 6bis and did not want to have our non-compli-
ance officially adjudicated ..., which would result in international embarrassment and
possibly severe trade sanctions as well."). Professor Joffrain also notes that "[a] similar
carving-out of moral rights also exists within the North American Free Trade Agreement,
exempting the United States from moral right obligations." Joffrain, supra note 22, at
751.
247. Antezana, supra note 30, at 426.
248. VARA, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a) (1994).
249. Id.
250. See Rebecca J. Martel, Note, The Should-It-Stay or Should-It-Go Spotlight: Protec-
tion of Site-Specific Art Under VARA, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 101, 107
(2003).
251. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(a)(3)(B) (2000).
252. Frazier, supra note 35, at 343.
253. Peeler, supra note 21, at 424 n.7.
254. For an amusing, albeit somewhat disturbing account of the first case interpreting
VARA, Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in
part, and vacated in part by 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), see Eric E. Benson, Note, The
Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990: Why Moral Rights Cannot Be Protected Under the United
States Constitution, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1127-29 (1996).
255. Based on a Lexis search conducted by author, October 8, 2004.
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Similarly, state experiments at implementing moral rights legislation
have resulted in anemic enforcement and apparent judicial apathy. Only
three published California decisions adjudicate claims made under the
1979 California Art Preservation Act, 25 6 which prohibits the "intentional
commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruc-
tion of a work of fine art," netting just one plaintiff victory. 25 7 New York's
Artists' Authorship Rights Act, 25 8 passed in 1984 using substantially simi-
lar language to the California statute, has had a similarly dismal track
record. 2 59 State-sponsored moral rights statutes appear destined to join
their federal variants in fading into obscurity.
B. Dastar and the Elimination of "Mutant Copyright"
With statutory moral rights moribund in the United States, some pro-
ponents have called for judges to rely on so-called "substitute theories, 260
such as unfair competition, defamation, contractual interpretation, and the
right of privacy, to organically expand these common law doctrines to
encompass a range of authors' rights. 26 1 The crux of the argument is that,
while such theories are insufficient in their current form to adequately pro-
tect moral rights, their value is that "some of them point to a more basic
principle," the protection of personality rights.2 62 Pared down to their evo-
lutionary core, the argument goes, defamation and its ilk share a common
origin with droit d'auteur, and therefore judges in "the time-honored tradi-
tion of the common law's resort to principle and analogy" would be justi-
fied in constructing a common law moral rights regime by reasoning from
first premises and logically extending these doctrines to their natural
256. California Civ. Code 987(c)(1) (1979); 987(c)(2) prohibits grossly negligent
conduct of the same sort.
257. Based on a Lexis search conducted by author, October 8, 2004. The sole plain-
tiff victory (pending retrial) was Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 229 Cal.App.3d 1130 (1991),
where defendant gas station destroyed a wall, on which plaintiffs had defendant's per-
mission to paint a mural, without notifying plaintiffs beforehand. The court held that
"the mural was within the protection of the Act." Id. at 1136. Arguably, the extreme
insensitivity with which the corporate defendant treated plaintiffs' work renders this
case an outlier.
258. N.Y. Art & Cult. Aft. § 14.03 (1) (1984).
259. Based on a Lexis search conducted by author, October 8, 2004. The two New
York cases that did not result in a full and outright verdict for the defendant (out of a
total of five) were Schatt v. Curtis Management Group, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), and Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that "defendants' motion for partial summary judgment was granted in part
and denied in part").
260. The term "substitute theory" is borrowed from Note, Eric M. Brooks, "Tilted"
Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights After U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77
Calif. L. Rev. 1431, 1439-72 (1989) (discussing the inherent inadequacies of employing
preexisting common law causes of action to protect moral rights).
261. See generally Damich, supra note 170, at 35-75 (surveying current U.S. common
law moral rights protection, and concluding that "[a]lthough American law occupies
some of the same ground as droit moral, considerable expansion of American law would
be necessary for it to be coextensive with droit moral.").
262. Id. at 95.
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conclusions. 263
However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twen-
tieth Century Fox Corp.26 4 demonstrates that circuitous routes to moral
rights claims also are incompatible with the United States' statute-based
economic copyright regime. Without ever invoking the phrase "moral
rights," the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Dastar stunted the
ability of claimants to construe noncopyright laws to bring moral rights
claims. In short, the controversy centered around a twenty-six episode tele-
vision series, first broadcast in 1949, and based on General Dwight D.
Eisenhower's book entitled Crusade in Europe, which recounted his World
War II experiences. 265 Twentieth Century Fox ("Fox") originally owned
the rights to the television version of Crusade, but failed to renew the copy-
right, so that in 1977, following the twenty-eight year statutory copyright
period, the work entered the public domain, pursuant to the Copyright Act
of 1909.266 In 1988, Fox reacquired "the exclusive right to distribute the
Crusade television series on video and sub-license others to do SO." 2 6 7 In
1995, Dastar purchased eight tapes of the 1949 version of Crusade, copied
them, removed any indication that they had been previously broadcast or
even that they were based on Eisenhower's book, spliced in its own name
and credits, and sold the videos as its own.
268
Fox responded by suing Dastar under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, which governs U.S. trademark law.2 69 Section 43(a) prohibits "us[ing]
263. Id.
264. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
265. Id. at 25-26.
266. See id. at 25 -26. The Copyright Act of 1909 prescribed a twenty-eight year copy-
right term from the date first publication, with the option of renewal for an additional
twenty-eight years. See An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copy-
right, § 23, reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, at T137,
T146 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976).
267. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26.
268. Id.
269. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2004). This Act provides the following:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or mislead-
ing description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commer-
cial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, character-
istics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term "any person" includes any State, instru-
mentality of a State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in
his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or
employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same manner and
to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
(3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this Act for trade dress
not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress pro-
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in commerce any... false designation of origin.., which is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 2 70 Section 43(a) provides a
statutory hook for an aggrieved party to raise a variety of false representa-
tion claims in federal court, including "reverse passing off," which occurs
when the public is led to believe that one party produced a good that in
fact a second party produced. 27 1 For example, if Coca-Cola fills bottles of
Coke with Pepsi formula, thereby leading consumers to mistakenly believe
they are drinking Coke, Pepsi would have a viable reverse passing off
claim.
2 7 2
Ostensibly, section 43(a) is the trademark equivalent of the moral
right of attribution (or "paternity"), an artist's inherent right to have her
work identified as her own to the public. 2 73 In a moral rights regime, for
instance, a master painter might bring a misattribution claim against a sec-
ond-rate artist who sells reproductions of the master's works as his own,
and the judge could require that the defendant print the word "copy" on all
reproductions to avoid potential customer confusion.2 74 The facial similar-
ity between the two causes of action, especially given that courts have
exhibited great flexibility in applying section 43(a) to various deceptive
practices, 2 75 was one reason that the United States Congress declined to
explicitly recognize moral rights in the Berne Implementation Act, instead
arguing that "Itihere is a composite of laws in this country that provides
the kind of protection envisioned by Article 6bis. ' ' 276 The United States
specifically cited section 43(a) to convince skeptical nations that "authors'
moral rights were protected by the United States under legal schemes other
than copyright."27 7 Arguably, then, a ruling in favor of Dastar would effec-
tively foreclose a federal common law right of attribution, and "might be
used by other countries to bring the United States' persistent noncompli-
tection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not
functional.
Id.
270. Id.
271. John T. Cross, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of
Reverse Passing Off in Trademark Law, 72 WASH. L. REV. 709, 737 (1997). "Reverse pass-
ing off" is the conceptual inverse of its precursor, "passing off," also prohibited under
section 43(a), which occurs when a party "sells its own goods using someone else's
name or mark." Id. at 710 n.9. While passing off fits more neatly within section 43(a)'s
prohibition against "false designation of origin," 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1) (2004), courts
have interpreted the statute as reaching "all deceptive practices that are economically
equivalent to passing off," in which category they include reverse passing off. Cross,
supra, at 737 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605
(9th Cir. 1981)).
272. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32. By contrast, passing off would prohibit Coca-Cola from
deceiving customers by slapping Pepsi labels on bottles filled with Coke. Id.
273. See generally Joffrain, supra note 22, at 768-70 (discussing the moral right of
attribution).
274. Id. at 770.
275. Cross, supra note 271, at 732.
276. Suhl, supra note 20, at 1212-13 & n.76 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 609, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 32-34 (1988)).
277. Janet Fries & MichaelJ. Remington, Who Remembers the Names? Authors' Rights
in Flux After Dastar Ruling, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003, IP Insert, at 30.
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ance with Article 6bis to the forefront of the international copyright
agenda." 2 78
When the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling in favor of
Fox's reverse passing off claim, faulting Dastar for "substantially copying"
the Crusade series and marketing it "without attribution to Fox,"279 it
appeared that section 43(a) could indeed become a haven for quasi-moral
rights claims on the borderland of copyright and trademark.28 0 Neither
court explicitly mentioned "moral rights"; nevertheless, Dastar's Peti-
tioner's Brief to the Supreme Court invoked the term on several occasions,
accusing Fox (and by extension the judges that found Dastar liable) of
attempting to construe the Lanham Act as a moral rights statute. 28 1 Fox,
on the other hand, vigorously denied that its claim was based on anything
other than straightforward trademark law. 28 2 Fox disavowed any support
for a "freestanding perpetual moral right" and emphasized its support for
the "statutory, constitutional, and even moral right to copy and dissemi-
nate products in the public domain. ' 28 3 But, Fox insisted, Dastar was not a
copyright case; rather, it arose under classic trademark law, where the con-
cept of a public domain is nonexistent. 284
However, Fox underestimated the Supreme Court's aversion to recast-
ing a copyright dispute as a trademark matter. Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Scalia clearly felt that a moral rights tempest was brewing within a
trademark teapot, one with implications for the public domain: "The right
to copy once a copyright has expired, and to copy without attribution...
passes to the public .... [OInce the patent or copyright monopoly has
expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attri-
bution."'28 5 Justice Scalia feared that finding for Fox would "create a spe-
cies of mutant copyright law that limits the public's federal right to copy
278. Ochoa, supra note 246, at 927.
279. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertainment Distributing, 34 Fed. Appx.
312, 314 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
280. The district court found defendants liable both for copyright infringement, hav-
ing "violated the copyright of Gen. Eisenhower's book," and for trademark violations,
"by bodily appropriating the Crusade Series and falsely identifying themselves as pro-
ducers of Campaigns...." Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22064, *1-*2, Case No. 98-7189 FMC (Ex) (C.D. Cal.).
281. Brief for Petitioner, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428). For example, Dastar
asserted that protecting the right of attribution for originators of works constituted a
moral rights claim "in direct conflict with the great caution Congress ha[d] shown as it
hald] added such rights to the Copyright Act." Id. at 7. Dastar reminded the Court that
"Congress ha[d] consistently refused to follow the path of those countries-mainly in
continental Europe-that offer authors and artists a broad, inalienable 'moral right' to be
identified whenever their works are displayed or published." Id. at 30.
282. Brief for Respondents, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428).
283. Id. at 9.
284. See id. at 10 ("The issue here is not whether Dastar was entitled to copy Fox's
creative work, but whether Dastar was entitled to copy Fox's work and then intentionally
misrepresent to consumers that the product was an original work created entirely by
Dastar.").
285. Id. (emphasis added).
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and to use, expired copyrights. ' 28 6 This would result in the rebirth of a
"species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not
do.",28 7
In essence, the Court must have been conscious that any holding in
favor of Fox-even if narrowly tailored to trademark law-would turn the
clock back to Millar v. Taylor 288 and encourage future pseudo-moral rights
litigation under the guise of the Lanham Act. The following exchange
involving "bodily appropriation," between the Court and Fox's counsel
during Oral argument, proves the point:
QUESTION: [The Ninth Circuit] has taken a rather extreme view of what the
Lanham Act protects.... [Ilt's a means, it seems to me, of expanding copy-
right protection.
MS. CENDALI: Your Honor, [I] really don't think so because, again, [Dastar]
could have copied. The problem isn't with the copying. The problem was
the taking credit for themselves. Going back to... [District Court] Judge
Cooper's description of her own summary judgment decision, she says, by
bodily appropriating the Crusade series and falsely identifying themselves
as producers of Campaigns-
QUESTION: How does the phrase, bodily appropriation, fit into the Lanham
Act?
MS. CENDALI: I think it's designed as a-as a tool in reverse passing off
cases where you're dealing with products to help assess how similar those -
those products are[.]
QUESTION: Certainly there's nothing like that in the Lanham Act itself.289
The "bodily appropriation" test incorporates many of the standards
from copyright jurisprudence. 290 Under copyright law, a defendant who
copies a plaintiffs work without "significant variations" has unlawfully
appropriated that work. 29 1 Some courts have extended that reasoning to
trademark law, finding defendants liable for bodily appropriation when
"consumers of the copy would confuse it for the original."2 92 Thus, by
holding that Dastar had committed a bodily appropriation when it "copied
substantially the entire Crusade in Europe series[,]... labeled the resulting
product with a different name and marketed it without attribution to Fox,"
the Ninth Circuit had in effect applied a copyright test to a trademark case
involving an expired copyright.2 93 The Supreme Court rightly recognized
that the entrenchment of this doctrine would encourage future creators to
bring reverse passing off trademark suits with the intended effect of
286. Id. (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
287. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
288. Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 209 (1769). For a discussion of Millar, see
supra Part I(C)(2).
289. Oral Argument at 33, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428).
290. Cross, supra note 271, at 725.
291. Id. at 725 n.71 (citing Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir.
1994)).
292. Id.
293. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertainment Distributing, 34 Fed. Appx.
312, 314 (2002).
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restricting unauthorized reproductions of works that no longer benefit
from statutory protection.
Nevertheless, considering that "every Circuit to consider the issue
found § 43(a) broad enough to encompass reverse passing off," the Court
was reluctant to entirely cripple the doctrine. 2 94 Instead, Justice Scalia
found a hook in the word "origin,"2 95 which he used to forge a substantive
distinction between bodily appropriation in the copyright context and its
trademark double. 296 According to Justice Scalia, unlike copyright law, the
common-law foundations of the Lanham Act "were not designed to protect
originality or creativity," and for that reason Congress intended "origin" to
refer only to "the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale,
and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in
those goods." 29 7
Driving a wedge between the creative origins of a work and the raw
materials on which it is proliferated, and assigning copyright to protect the
former and trademark the latter, the Court hoped to prevent the Lanham
Act from "creating a cause of action for, in effect, plagiarism. ' 298 Using
that logic, the Court found that, at worst, Dastar's actions constituted
nonattribution (i.e., not identifying Fox as the original creator of Crusades),
which is permissible under copyright for public domain works, rather than
misattribution (i.e., falsely taking credit for producing Crusades), which
violates the Lanham Act's prohibition on misrepresentation. 2 99 The dis-
tinction is critical: While misattribution falls squarely within the ambit of
trademark protection, nonattribution is purely a copyright issue.30 0 In
moral rights regimes, the original creator can prevent both nonattribution
and misattribution, whether or not the work is in the public domain, by
invoking her moral rights. 30 ' In the United States, however, the public
interest trumps that of the author, and the original creator is powerless to
prevent even whole-scale pilfering of works no longer protected by the stat-
utory copyright monopoly.30 2 Thus, had the Court upheld the Ninth Cir-
cuit's ruling in favor of Fox, it effectively would have allowed Fox to enforce
the moral right of attribution by invoking trademark law, circumventing
the limit on authors' statutory monopoly. Without mentioning the words
"moral rights," the Court foreclosed future claims that, in substance, would
mimic the moral right of attribution, even if ostensibly brought as
noncopyright claims.
Clearly, the Justices were not disposed to stretch the Lanham Act to
protect works that had entered the public domain. But the crux of the
294. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 30 (2003).
295. Liability under § 43(a) requires that the plaintiff demonstrate "confusion ... as
to the origin . .. of his or her goods." 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(A) (2004).
296. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32.
297. Id. at 37.
298. Id. at 36.
299. See id. at 31-38.
300. See id.
301. See Joffrain, supra note 22, at 768-70.
302. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31-38 (2003).
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problem is not simply that the Lanham Act is ill-suited to provide cover for
authors whose works risk being copied without attribution. Rather, no
existing body of law could offer such coverage without replacing what Pro-
fessor Dallon describes as the "utilitarian, or public benefit, rationale of
copyright law," with natural law copyright.30 3 Since the passage of the
Statute of Anne in 1710, Anglo-American history has involved the system-
atic displacement of natural law copyright, wherein "the author has an
inherent ownership right in the work,"'30 4 in favor of statutory copyright,
wherein the author's incentive to create "is balanced against the public's
need for access to the work."'30 5 Conversely, moral rights embrace rather
than repudiate natural law, and require acquiescence to the principles of a
brand of natural law-that protecting personality rights-with no basis in
the historical foundations of Anglo-American copyright, premised on the
"belief that the subjectivity of creators deserves unquestioning protection"
wholly apart from their economic interests. 30 6 Not only would the expan-
sion of moral rights necessarily entail the reabsorption of natural law into
U.S. copyright, it would force American courts to apply French, as opposed
to American, natural law theories in shaping their decisions. That such an
occurrence is inimical to the functioning of the common law is axiomatic:
common law develops from "norms and patterns of behavior [that exist] in
the minds of the people, in the consciousness of the community. '30 7 In
Dastar, the Court reaffirmed that the U.S. copyright regime is one in which
"[tihe rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a 'carefully
crafted bargain,"' 30 8 and part of the bargain vests the public with "[tihe
right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has
expired." 30 9 While Dastar demonstrates that the United States is unlikely
to fulfill its responsibilities under the Berne Convention, sweeping aside
the foundational principles of U.S. copyright is far too great a price to pay
for such an indulgence.
Conclusion
In Wheaton's wake, U.S. courts have only entertained copyright claims
arising from federal acts and the Constitution, and have ruled that any
expansion of copyright protection necessarily must come from Congres-
303. Dallon, supra note 3, at 367.
304. Id. at 368.
305. Id. at 367.
306. Zlatarski, supra note 245, at 203. Zlatarski argues that French moral rights
regime has fostered a system where, "[bly jealously guarding artists' moral rights at the
expense of the interests of others, the law encourages arrogance and insensitivity on the
part of artists." Id. at 208.
307. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 481 (1983).
308. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 150-51, 103 L. Ed. 2d 118, 109 S. Ct. 971 (1989)).
309. Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230, 11 L. Ed. 2d
661, 84 S. Ct. 784, 1964 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 425 (1964)).
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sional action rather than judicial activism. 310 On numerous occasions, the
Supreme Court has held that the Copyright Clause's foremost aim is not to
reward authors but to employ the "limited grant [as] a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved." 311 Though a number of com-
mentators have argued that the Court has been overly deferential to Con-
gress's arbitrary lengthening of the copyright term,312 the Court clearly
respects Congress's mandate to balance the public and private interests as
it sees fit.
Congress has also repeatedly treated copyright as strictly a creature of
positive law.3 13 Perhaps the quintessential expression of the pro-public
domain, anti-natural rights sentiment came in the form of the 1909 Copy-
right Act, which, in extending the author's monopoly to two twenty-eight
year terms, clarified that "the object of all legislation must be... to promote
science and the useful arts[,]. . . not primarily for the benefit of the
author ... "314 Turning to natural rights, Congress was adamant that
"[tihe enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the term of the
Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his
writing."315 The Copyright Act of 1976 then eliminated the final vestige of
common law copyright-the perpetual copyright for unpublished works-
by pegging the running of the statute to the moment of a work's creation,
rather than its publication.3 16 Professor Patterson notes that these policy
preferences, which have echoed throughout U.S. history, are necessary to
retain the Founders' calibration of competing interests: "If copyright is an
example of natural law property, the rights will be weighted in favor of the
copyright holder; if copyright is a marketing monopoly, the rights will be
310. See Garon, supra note 26, at 1310 (noting that "[tihe Supreme Court has repeat-
edly recognized the power of Congress to adjust the balance of rights between authors,
publishers, and the public").
311. Dallon, supra note 3, at 431 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). Among the cases that reaffirmed American copyright's statu-
tory derivation are Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349-50 (1991); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524, 526 (1994); N.Y. Times v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 496 n.3 (2001); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975). Dallon, supra note 3, at 430 n.414.
312. See, e.g., Ginsburg, et al., How Long Is Too Long?, supra note 30, at 667 ("[Tlhe
sheer randomness of any congressional copyright term extension is such [that] it cannot
constitute a meaningful present incentive."); Ammori, supra note 146, at 291 ("The pub-
lic domain of the future cannot be protected without constraints on prospective copy-
right duration.").
313. Strowel, supra note 16, at 244.
314. Ammori, supra note 146, at 313 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222 (1909)).
315. Strowel, supra note 16, at 244-245 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NiM-
MER, 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, iv., app. 13-9) (1992) (emphasis added).
316. Compare 17 U.S.C. 303(a) (1976) (before being amended by the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act) ("Copyright in a work created before January 1, 1978,
but not theretofore in the public domain or copyrighted, subsists from January 1,
1978 .... "), quoted in Ginsburg, et. al., How Long Is Too Long?, supra note 30, at 687
n.67, with Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 2, 35 Stat. 1075, 1090 (1909) ("[Nlothing in
this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an
unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or
use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor."),
quoted in Ginsburg, et. al., How Long Is Too Long?, supra note 30, at 687 n.68.
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more evenly balanced among author, publisher, and user."317
The contrast between the American and French approach to copyright
law could not be more pronounced. Congress, constitutionally assigned
with the task of balancing the interests of copyright holders and the public,
had legislated common law copyright out of existence. Meanwhile, with
the Law of March 11, 1957, France's copyright regime squarely gave effect
to an interpretation of natural law rooted in the unalienable personality
rights of authors, unabridged by positive law, ensuring the doctrine's per-
manence in French society.318 The basic premise of a moral rights regime
is that personality rights are inalienable, and trump the rights of the public
domain.3 19
Because these two definitions of "natural rights"-one based on per-
sonality and the other on property-clash in a fundamental way, legisla-
tively transplanting French "natural rights" onto American soil is
inherently paradoxical. French moral rights developed incrementally over
half a millennium (or, if one takes the French Revolution as a starting
point, over two hundred years), as semi-coherent arguments made in medi-
eval courts have over time crystallized into concrete, refined doctrines that
were finally legitimized by statutory enactments. How could any U.S. stat-
ute embody the nuances and conform to the precise dimensions of these
rights, which are after all projections of the cumulative values of French
society, and reflections of myriad judicial decisions that collectively
encompass the doctrine of droit d'auteur? On U.S. soil, this framework is
absent; moral rights statutes would signify nothing more than the naked
words that comprise then.
While in a vacuum it might be feasible to fill out such statutes with
layers of common law interpretation, judges simply cannot be expected to
construe authors' rights legislation in a manner consistent with the Consti-
tution, copyright acts, and judicial precedent, and still give effect to the
rights set forth by the statutes. Thrown into the midst of copyright's con-
stitutional bramble-bush, 320 moral rights is not easily reconciled with
more established common law doctrines. Even the Visual Artists Rights
Act, passed nearly fifteen years ago, has generated little more than a ripple.
Undoubtedly, any future statutes would meet the same lukewarm
response. In the final analysis, the United States' rejection of natural law
3,17. L. Ray Patterson, Nimmer's Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls, supra note 165, at
434.
318. See Damich, supra note 170, at 6-7. The doctrine's "first legal adoption in
French law was not official until 1992," although "the French legislature officially recog-
nized them individually, although not by that title, in a 1957 legislative amendment."
Peeler, supra note 21, at 426.
319. See Garon, supra note 26, at 1301 ("[alnointing the author's relationship with his
work as essential and unrestricted stands in diametric opposition to the open market-
place of ideas idealized in the United States.").
320. See generally MattJackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity
in International Copyright, 43 IDEA 607, 625 (2003) (surveying various constitutional
issues presented by the incorporation of moral rights in the United States, including the
"utilitarian premise on which U.S. copyright law is based and constitutionally
grounded" and the First Amendment's protections of fair use).
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literary property rights and its constitutional mandate to promote "Science
and the useful Arts" for the public good leave no cracks in the pavement
through which droit d'auteur could take root, much less flourish.
Dastar highlights the infeasibility of introducing moral rights in the
United States through either common law or statute. Even accepting argu-
endo that American courts and legislatures could feasibly (and constitu-
tionally) return to the Millar world, where the common law granted rights
unhindered by statutory copyright laws, Anglo-American natural property
rights are inextricably linked to conceptions of physical ownership.
Accordingly, only the actual owner of an object can assert claims flowing
from violations of his ownership rights, while moral rights assume that the
literary property can be divided between the owner (the purchaser of a
text) and the creator of a work.
Anglo-American common law has never recognized a natural right
connected to mere creation in the absence of ownership. It may be argued
that while "the author was a comparative latecomer into the development of
copyright in England, rather than being its starting-point as was the case in
France," 32 ' a late start should not inhibit Anglo-American authors from
enjoying the same abundant legal protections as their European brethren.
However, this approach wrongly assumes that the balance of power
between the author and the public domain would remains constant irre-
spective of the adoption of moral rights. In the absence of evidence to sug-
gest that the paucity of moral rights has hampered creative output in the
United States, and that this has diminished the overall quality of the works
available to the public and consequently weakened the public domain, it is
all but certain that moral rights will have a deleterious effect on all but the
creator. Though moral rights may be functional in France and other coun-
tries that have adopted them, in the attempt to transfer them to the United
States, a great deal is lost in the translation.
321. FEATHER, supra note 49, at 3-4.

